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This thesis compares the effects of Marine Corps graduate education programs, 
categorized as either Professional Military Education (PME) or Non-PME, on officer 
performance.  The intent of the thesis is to provide empirical evidence to support or refute 
Marine Corps cultural perceptions that PME improves officer performance more than 
Non-PME graduate education.  A performance index (PI) is derived from the current 
Marine Corps fitness report system and averaged before and after graduate education for 
PME and Non-PME graduates and for a group of officers without graduate education 
(NOS).  Data from the Marine Corps Total Force Data Warehouse are used to assess the 
marginal effect of graduate education in models that also included demographic, affective 
and cognitive traits.  ANOVA results for O4s show significant improvement in 
performance over time for all groups (PME, Non-PME and NOS), with the largest 
improvement for PME and the smallest for NOS, although differences between groups 
are not significant.  Multivariate regressions indicate that, after accounting for other 
influences, the post-education performance of those with graduate education is not 
significantly different from those without (NOS).  The change in performance between 
before and after receiving graduate education is not significantly different for PME and 
NOS, while it is slightly lower for Non-PME than for NOS (significant at .10 level).  A 
limitation of the study is that the data only covered four years of fitness reports.  Thus, 
we were not able to assess the long-run effects of graduate education on officer 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Marine Corps is the United States' premier fighting force designed 
specifically to meet the immediate, complex and often unforeseen threats to our national 
security.  As an organization, the Marine Corps is prepared for countless types of 
missions (combat or non-combat) through its ability to adapt to challenges over time.  It 
is the attributes of Marine officers such as creative thinking, sound judgment and decisive 
action that result in this ability to adapt.  As we embark on a new era of warfare where 
the threat is small terrorist factions instead of hostile nations, these attributes of Marines 
become increasingly important.  Through effective education the Marine Corps can 
improve officers’ ability to adapt to this volatile combat environment.  For example, the 
benefit of Marine Corps graduate education programs is two fold: first it is expected that 
graduate education will enhance job performance; second, graduate education should 
provide an incentive for officers to remain on active duty.  It is therefore imperative that 
the Marine Corps continue to assess existing education programs through empirical 
analysis of performance, retention and other benefits. 
Central to maintaining highly effective officers is the Marine Corps' ability to 
educate officers beyond the baccalaureate level. Graduate education in disciplines that 
improve the ability of officers to function proficiently in an uncertain combat 
environment is the goal of Marine graduate education.  It is expected that the investment 
in graduate education will yield as much if not more benefit to the Marine Corps' combat 
capability as investments in physical capital such as weapons, equipment, or aircraft.  
Unlike materiel or technology, an educated officer has the ability to function in a given 
environment but also to adapt to changes in that environment.  Over time an educated 
officer can be proficient in numerous combat environments and scenarios, whereas 
materiel and equipment must constantly be updated and modified to meet new 
challenges.  Additionally, a Marine officer who has matured during his career can then 
share what he has learned with junior officers.  Thus, the benefitS of graduate education 
to the Corps include: first, a proficient leader who can adapt to an uncertain and ever-
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changing environment; and second, a mentor for subordinate officers who imbues 
knowledge and ensures that past experiences are not forgotten.  
Military graduate education programs in each of the armed services were initiated 
separately and independently without any unifying doctrine or policy.  The development 
of educational programs in each service was unique until the end of World War II.  
However, in 1945 the federal government imposed guidelines on all armed services with 
respect to officer education.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff "chartered the Richardson 
Committee (1945) to examine the entire organizational structure of the military and 
recommend improvements based on the experiences of the war." (CJCSI 1800.01A pg. 
A-A-1).  The result was the creation of the Department of Defense, which "strongly 
advocated establishing a system for joint education." (CJCSI 1800.01A pg. A-A-1).  The 
Department of Defense placed a strong emphasis on knowledge acquisition, making it 
paramount to maintaining a capable and effective military, but offered no specific 
guidance or requirements for what military officers should learn or how that education 
should be administered.   
The Marine Corps, like the other services, continued to commit time, effort and 
resources to the educational programs that were already in existence.  However, no 
significant changes were made in what was being taught or how Marine officers were 
utilizing that knowledge.  It was not until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that any 
"intensive reassessment of the military educational system" took place.  (CJCSI 
1800.01A pg. A-A-1).  In the years following the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Marine 
Corps continued to place less emphasis on its educational programs, particularly at the 
graduate level, compared to the other services.  The result has been the continuation of 
existing graduate programs, the creation of new programs with no clear goals and the 
fostering of a Marine Corps culture that values operational experience over education.  
Evidence of a culture that is averse to graduate education is shown in Figure 1.1, which 
finds Marine officers in the 1981 cohort are less likely to have graduate degrees than 















































Source:   DMDC cohort data from FY 1981 to FY 1998 
Note:  data represents all officer accessions during FY81 for each service 
 
Figure 1.   Percent of Officers in 1981 Cohort with Graduate Education By Service 
 
Today the Marine Corps, like the other services, finds itself struggling to maintain 
an effective fighting force as many of the officers who possess the valuable attributes of 
creative and analytical thinking and sound judgment are drawn out of the military into 
civilian employment.  Marine Corps graduate education programs have thus taken on an 
additional role since the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  They can be used as an effective 
weapon against officer attrition.  Now more than ever, it is important to understand the 
effect graduate education programs have on officer performance and the role of graduate 
education in retention decisions. 
Given the potential benefits of an educated and experienced officer, the Marine 
Corps needs to assess the relevant costs and returns of each of its officer graduate 
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education programs with the same level of scrutiny that is given to the effectiveness of 
new weapon systems.   
A. BACKGROUND 
 There are several programs that offer Marine officers the opportunity to attain 
education beyond the baccalaureate level.  These programs are varied but all purport to 
have similar educational objectives such as improving cognitive skills, creative thinking 
and judgment.  Programs such as the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps War 
College, Special Education Program and Advanced Degree Program are a few that share 
the same goals.  Despite the similarity of goals, the manner in which they achieve them 
varies significantly.  Each program is controlled by different organizations within the 
Marine Corps and hence is allotted different resources.  Moreover, there is no 
overarching policy that governs how all officer education programs are administered.  
Many differences exist, such as program duration, focus of curricula, duty status (e.g., 
resident or non-resident) and utilization of graduates. Despite these differences, our 
analysis of Marine graduate education programs groups all programs into two categories.  
Officer education programs are classified as either Professional Military Education 
(PME) or traditional graduate education (Non-PME).   
 PME programs are designed so that Marine officers can participate in them 
throughout an entire career of service.  PME schools are structured as a step process that 
increases in duration, difficulty and scope.   In 1989 all PME schools were consolidated 
under one command, the Marine Corps University, whose mission is: 
Develop, execute, and evaluate professional military education focusing 
on leadership and our core competencies through resident and distance 
education Programs in order to prepare students to meet the challenges of 
present and future operational environments. (MCUmission, MCUonline, 
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/).   
Of the existing PME schools today, only two, the Command and Staff College 
(CSC) and the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR), offer a graduate degree for full-
time (resident) students.  The focus of these programs is inherently military in nature and 
does not go beyond the scope of Marine Corps and Joint doctrine and theory on force 
employment in various combat operations.  Not all participants in the CSC and MCWAR 
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achieve graduate degrees; however, the course of study for all students is at the graduate 
level.  Some officers in these programs are selected to complete additional writing 
requirements in order to achieve a Master's of Military Studies or Master's of Strategic 
Studies.  The education offered by CSC and MCWAR resembles more traditional 
graduate education programs in its intent "to concentrate – for selected field grade 
officers – in decision-making and complex problem-solving experience at the operational 
level."  (CSC Purpose and Mission, CSC online 
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/csc/purpose.htm). Because CSC and MCWAR are PME 
schools, they are specifically addressed in various Marine Corps policies as being 
beneficial to officers for continued self-improvement and promotion.  For example, the 
precepts for a recent Marine promotion board stated that PME schools are "a valuable 
and important aspect of a Marine officer's professional development" and "successful 
completion...represents a desire to prepare for positions of increased responsibility."  
(SECNAV, FY04 LtCol Promotion precept).  The Marine Corps Order that establishes 
the requirements for PME completion at all grades refers to the 1989 Marine Corps 
University Charter, which intended to make PME "a main stream part of every Marine's 
career." (PME Order, MCO P1553.4A Dec 1999).  It is the existence of these policies 
that creates a cultural perception among officers that PME schools are highly beneficial 
to the Corps and the individual attending.  There is no adverse impact on an officer's 
career by undertaking PME graduate programs as the officer may return, upon 
completion, to his primary occupational field and serve in any billet that his career track 
will allow.  Regardless of the many benefits of PME schools, some officers choose to 
participate in the other graduate education programs that the Marine Corps offers.      
The Marine Corps graduate education programs that fall into the Non-PME 
category are more varied and are considered to be more traditional in that their curricula 
are structured similarly to civilian graduate programs.  Programs such as the Special 
Education Program (SEP) and the Advanced Degree Program (ADP) fall into this 
category.  Unlike PME, the Manpower and Reserve Affairs Division at Headquarters 
Marine Corps manage both SEP and ADP.  They are similar to PME graduate programs 
in that they are resident programs, meaning that participation is an officer's full time duty.  
The educational objectives of SEP and ADP are also to sharpen analytical and problem-
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solving skills. However, the goals of SEP and ADP are different from those of PME 
graduate programs.  The mission of SEP and ADP, as stated below, is to prepare officers 
to serve in specific billets that require graduate education, which may or may not be 
similar to an officer's primary military occupational specialty (MOS):  
The Marine Corps has identified and validated several hundred billets, 
which are required to be staffed by officers who possess postgraduate 
level education. The graduate education programs, Advanced Degree 
Program (ADP) and SEP were established as a means of providing the 
Marine Corps with a sufficient number of qualified officers to fill these 
billets.  (SEP Order MCO 1520.9F May 1993)     
Non-PME graduate degree disciplines (e.g., SEP and ADP) range from technical 
fields such as Computer Science and Operations Analysis to non-technical fields such as 
Accounting and Management.  All of these have application in the Marine Corps but 
none are strictly military in nature.     
Utilization of SEP and ADP graduates is more restrictive as compared to PME 
graduate education in that officers must serve in at least one specific staff billet where 
graduate education is required.  Assignment to one of these specialized billets may be 
outside the normal career progression of an officer's primary MOS.  Additionally, the 
same language in promotion policies that creates the perception that PME graduate 
education is highly beneficial to the individual officer, and therefore more appealing, 
does not exist for the Non-PME programs SEP or ADP.  Marine officers, however, may 
choose to participate in Non-PME programs because of the broader range of degree 
disciplines and the potential for future benefit in the civilian labor market.     
There are two other graduate degree programs that may be classified as Non-
PME: the Funded Law Education Program (FLEP) and the Extended Leave Program, 
Law (ELP-L).  Manpower and Reserve Affairs Division also manages FLEP and ELP-L 
but these programs serve a slightly different purpose.  Officers participate in either of 
these programs to attain a law degree and become Marine Corps lawyers thereby 
changing their primary MOS.  Participation in FLEP or ELP-L ultimately changes the 
career path of an officer in addition to granting a graduate level degree.  Utilization of 
officers in these programs is very specific and restricted to only Judge Advocate General 
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(JAG) billets.  Career and promotion potential for officers in FLEP or ELP-L are not 
subject to the same perceptions that may impact other PME or Non-PME graduate 
programs with respect to individual or organizational benefit.  Graduates of these 
programs satisfy a requirement for lawyers during the remainder of their careers unlike 
PME graduates who continue to serve in their primary MOS or other Non-PME graduates 
who fill a specific billet and then return to their primary MOS.  
There is an inherent expectation that an education program, regardless of its 
focus, will provide some benefit to both the individual and the organization.  The benefits 
to an individual may be in the form of self-improvement and the potential for future 
monetary return.  Similarly for the organization, the benefit of education may be reflected 
in increased productivity or proficiency of its employees.  The difficulty for the Marine 
Corps in maintaining a wide spectrum of graduate education programs lies in accurately 
assessing the performance (productivity) benefit that it realizes from each.  For individual 
Marine officers the difficulty lies in choosing the graduate program that offers the 
greatest benefit with respect to self-improvement and potential reward.  Failure to make 
an accurate assessment by either party can result in a misallocation of resources or an 
emphasis on one program over another based on cultural perceptions rather than on 
empirical evidence.   
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This research examines the effect of Marine Corps graduate education programs, 
both PME and Non-PME, on officer performance.  The purpose is to explore and identify 
any difference in officer performance that may be attributed to either graduate program.  
This study analyzes the impact of each graduate program utilizing a common measure of 
officer performance derived from the Marine Corps Performance Evaluation System 
(PES).  The objective of the analysis is to assess the return to the Marine Corps from its 
graduate education programs via their effect on officer productivity.  The study attempts 
to provide information that will be useful to policy makers and Marine officers in 
assessing the value of all Marine Corps graduate programs.  This study provides an 
objective analysis of the effects of both types of graduate education (PME and Non-
PME).  It also attempts to examine the perception that PME graduate education is the 
most beneficial to officer performance. 
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 Prior studies have attempted to describe the benefit of various graduate level 
education programs through examination of historical data on promotion rates, retention 
rates, and the probability of achieving positions of operational command.  A weakness of 
these studies is that using a proxy for performance, such as promotion or retention rates 
interjects the effects of other factors that may be unrelated to education and performance. 
For example, retention and promotion are both affected by MOS shortages, force shaping 
by the organization and self-selection.  Additionally, prior studies have used historical 
performance data from before 1999.  In 1998 the Marine Corps introduced a new fitness 
report as part of the PES.  The new report was intended to alleviate the inflated 
performance grades that had existed in the fitness report system, and give a more accurate 
assessment of every officer's performance.  Using fitness report data prior to 1999 as the 
dependent variable in some of the previous studies may have provided less reliable 
estimates of he effect of graduate education due to the inflation of fitness report grades 
and low variability across individuals 
This study differs from earlier works in that the officer performance will be 
measured by a Performance Index (PI) derived from the Marine Corps' PES.  By using a 
PI we hope to limit the effects of factors that are unrelated to education or performance.  
Also, the data on which this analysis is based will include performance grades of the new 
fitness report adopted by the Marine Corps in 1999, which should provide greater 
variation across individuals and thus a more accurate indicator of performance. 
C.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis first describes the two populations of officers that have participated in 
graduate education via either PME or Non-PME.  Then, a thorough description of the 
measure of performance, the PES, is presented.  After analyzing historical performance 
data and other pertinent officer attributes we specify models to predict the effects of 
graduate education and to compare the effects of PME and Non-PME graduate education.  
Finally, we use our results to draw conclusions and make recommendations on how the 
Marine Corps may better allocate resources to the different graduate programs in order to 
maximize benefits. 
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Chapter II is a literature review of prior studies.  Literature relevant to labor 
market economics and the results of prior studies are reviewed to assist in the selection of 
the variables for our predictive models.  Chapter III consists of an in-depth description of 
the policies, directives and perceptions that surround PME and Non-PME officer 
education in the Marine Corps.  It establishes a basis for comparison of both categories of 
education through an objective evaluation of program similarities and differences.  
Chapter IV describes the current policies and procedures that govern the Marine Corps' 
Performance Evaluation System.  This chapter also establishes the validity of using a PI 
derived from the PES and details the derivation of the PI.  Chapters V and VI present our 
empirical methodology, model specification, and discusses the data and results.  Chapter 
VII brings together the results of our analysis, points out strengths and limitations, and 
draws conclusions about the performance effects of PME and Non-PME graduate 
education.  Chapter VII also presents recommendations on how to utilize the 
methodology and findings of this study to assess the value of Marine Corps graduate 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
The effect of graduate education on job performance is examined in labor 
economics literature.  The theories of human capital and signaling theory are recurring 
topics in economic analyses.  The two theories support varying views on the economics 
of graduate education.  Additionally, labor economics highlights the difficulty of 
conducting quantitative research on the returns to graduate education. The difficulties are 
in measuring productivity and the role of selection bias in quantifying the returns to 
graduate education.  A discussion of human capital theory, signaling theory, and the 
difficulties of studying the impact of graduate education on job performance provide a 
foundation for a further review of literature directly related to the research question. 
Human capital theory asserts that graduate education is an investment in 
individuals that has similar attributes to traditional physical capital investments.  Within 
the framework of human capital theory graduate education can be analyzed in the same 
way as any other investment.  Just as firms and individuals weigh specific costs and seek 
specific benefits in making financial investments, human capital theory assumes that the 
same weighing of costs and benefits characterizes the behavior of firms and individuals 
when investing in graduate education.  “As with any other investment, an investment in 
human capital entails costs that are borne in the near term with the expectation that 
benefits will accrue in the future.” (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000).   
In this study the firm is the United States Marine Corps.  The near term costs to 
the Marine Corps of investing in graduate education include the fiscal funding for 
graduate education programs and the opportunity costs of assigning an officer to an 
educational billet rather than to an operational billet.  The expected benefit to the Marine 
Corps of the graduate education investment is improved future on-the-job performance.   
The Marine Corps seeks a return on its investment primarily through assigning the 
graduates of its fully funded graduate programs to subspecialty or staff utilization tours.  
The near-term costs to the officer include the psychic costs of arduous study and the 
opportunity cost of foregoing an operational billet.  For the officer, “the expected returns 
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are in the form of higher future earnings, increased job satisfaction over one’s lifetime, 
and a greater appreciation of nonmarket activities and interests.”(Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2000).  Because the Marine Corps is a closed labor market with a fixed pay scale 
dependent on only rank and time in service, the expected return of higher future earnings 
attributed to improved performance cannot be realized while in active service.  Rather, 
higher probability of promotion during active service is one of the expected benefits for 
officers who undertake graduate education.  The post-service benefits for officers include 
higher earnings and enhanced employment opportunities in the civilian sector.  Thus, the 
Marine Corps’ decision to provide funded graduate education and the officer’s decision 
to participate in graduate education can be modeled as economic decisions.   If the 
discounted future benefits of increased on-the-job performance by officers who attend 
graduate education exceed the near term costs of such programs, the Marine Corps should 
invest in graduate education.  If not, the Marine Corps should not invest in graduate 
education.  Likewise, if the discounted expected future benefits realized by the increased 
probability of promotion and other outcomes exceed the near terms costs of undertaking 
advanced learning, the officer should also invest in graduate education.  If not, the officer 
should not invest in graduate education.    It should be noted that, unlike the civilian 
sector, the Marine Corps subsidizes most of the officer’s direct costs of investment in 
education. 
Signaling theory views the role of graduate education in labor economics in a 
different way than human capital theory.   The signaling model asserts that employers use 
formal schooling such as graduate education as a screening device.   Employers seek to 
identify the most productive workers.  By successfully screening out less productive 
workers a firm can hire, terminate, and compensate based on the productivity of its 
employees.  Signaling theory states that the decision of an individual to seek or not to 
seek formal education is a signal of the true productivity of the individual. This behavior 
is known as “educational signaling”.(Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000).   If those who acquire 
education tend to have personal characteristics such as greater motivation, discipline, and 
commitment that are correlated with higher productivity, then undertaking graduate 
school is a signal of a productive individual.     It must be noted that, from the signaling 
theory viewpoint, advanced education does not necessarily improve worker productivity.   
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With respect to the Marine Corps and its officers, signaling theory implies that officers 
who participate in graduate programs send a signal that identifies them as productive 
officers.   Additionally, under the signaling theory an employer will not be willing to pay 
for a graduate degree unless it is less costly than using some other means (e.g., testing) to 
identify the most productive workers.  The value of graduate education as illustrated by 
the signaling model is thus different from the human capital model.  In the former, the 
utility of advanced education to the Marine Corps and the officer is identifying those who 
are most productive.  In the latter, the utility of advanced education is an investment with 
the expected return of increased job productivity in the future.   
Whether analyzed through the human capital model or the signaling model, 
research on the returns to graduate education is complicated by the difficulty of 
quantifying the non-monetary costs and benefits of education and adjusting for the role of 
selection bias.   As noted earlier, the decision by the employer and the employee to 
undertake advanced education is determined by comparing near term costs to expected 
future benefits.  The two widely accepted rules for conducting such analysis are the 
present value rule and the internal rate of return rule.  Applying these rules requires 
quantifying both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and benefits.  Quantifying pecuniary 
aspects such as direct program costs and foregone earnings is elementary, but psychic 
costs and benefits are not as easily captured.  Critics of research that strives to explain the 
returns to graduate education argue that without quantifying non-pecuniary aspects any 
such analysis is incomplete.  Additionally, it is argued that the lack of accurate and 
standardized methods to measure worker productivity prevents researchers from 
analyzing the primary benefit to firms of educational investments.    
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Further complicating research in this area, labor economists add “there are 
potential biases in the estimated rate of return to education.  These biases, which are of 
unknown size, work in opposite directions.”(Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000).  The biases are 
ability bias and self-selection bias.  Ability bias causes the return on graduate education 
to be overstated.  The human capital model assumes that the expected future benefit of 
increased on-the-job performance is attributed in whole to the performance-enhancing 
effect of education.    The role of ability bias is “people who are smarter and more 
dynamic are likely to obtain more schooling and might be more productive even if they 
did not complete more years of schooling.” (Ehrenbergh and Smith, 2000).   Therefore, 
not taking into account the innate abilities of individuals who acquire graduate education 
overstates the performance benefit of advanced education.    
Self-selection bias causes the return to education to be either overstated or 
understated.    In natural experiments the premise of randomness amongst treatment and 
control groups must be maintained to assure unbiased results.  In observational studies 
self-selection bias is the tendency for individuals to choose or abstain from participating 
in activities, such as graduate education, depending on their aptitudes.  Those who are 
academically talented or enjoy academia will self-select into graduate programs, whereas 
those who are mechanically talented or enjoy non-academic activities may not 
participate.  Thus, depending on one’s aptitudes towards education, self-selection bias 
can cause the returns to graduate education to be mis-stated.  Self-selection bias also 
introduces non-randomness into empirical analysis.  The premise of randomness in 
inferential statistics must be maintained to ensure unbiased and consistent results.   
B. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF PME/NON-PME AND 
PERFORMANCE 
Studies on the return to graduate education are extensive.  However, research that 
specifically examines the effect of graduate education on the performance of Marine 
officers is less common.  The studies selected for review are chosen to present the latest 
work on graduate education and officer performance and to build a framework for 
understanding the methods employed in this research.  Branigan’s (2001) Master’s thesis,  
“The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion of Marine Corps 
Officers” is the latest study on the research question.  Branigan summarizes all of the 
related studies prior to 2001.  Branigan’s primary contribution to this research is his 
summary of prior work.  Branigan’s summary includes Cymrot’s (1986) “Graduate 
Education and the Promotion of Officers,” Bowman and Mehay’s (1999) “Graduate 
education and employee performance: evidence from military personnel,” Long’s (1992) 
“Effect of Variables Independent of Performance on Promotion Rates to Major, 
Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel in the Marine Corps,” and Estridge’s (1995) “A 
Comparative Analysis of Promotion Probabilities For Marine Corps Field Grade Officers 
With Special Attention Given to Graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School.” Two 
14 
doctoral dissertations are most pertinent to this study. Roush’s (1972) dissertation  “A 
Study of the Effects of Participation by Marine Corps Officers in the Special Education 
Program on their Military Performance Ratings” provides insight into the effect of 
traditional graduate studies on officer performance, while Lloyd’s (1977) dissertation “A 
Study of the Effects of Attending an Amphibious Warfare Course Upon the Postgraduate 
Performance of Military Duties by U.S. Marine Corps Officers” provides insight into the 
effect of PME on officer performance.  Together, Roush’s and Lloyd’s research serve as 
a complete framework for describing this study’s econometric analysis.      
1. Study by Cymrot (1986) 
Cymrot’s (1986) “Graduate Education and the Promotion of Officers,” study 
asserts that performance evaluations, promotion and retention are valid indicators of 
productivity in the military.  The author goes further to propose that promotion to higher 
levels of responsibility and pay is the primary indicator of productivity in the military.  
Cymrot’s principle relationship of interest is the effect of fully funded graduate education 
on the promotion of Navy officers.    The cross sectional data used are from the 1985 
Officer Master File.  All officers from the ranks of O4 through O7 are used in the study.  
Cymrot hypothesizes that an officer who is selected for promotion ahead of his accession 
cohort has demonstrated outstanding performance.    The author recognizes that selection 
for fully funded graduate education is contingent upon potential for promotion to the next 
rank, thus introducing selection bias into the analysis.  Cymrot does not attempt to correct 
for selection bias.   Because of selection bias the impact of graduate education on 
promotion cannot be totally attributed to advanced education and may be overstated.  
Cymrot uses a logistic regression (LOGIT) model to explain the impact of graduate 
education and other officer traits on the probability of promotion.   In addition to 
participation in graduate education, the author includes explanatory variables for age, sex, 
race, and time in grade for previous ranks, continuous active service and branch 
designation.    
Cymrot’s results reveal that graduate education is statistically significant in 
explaining promotion to the ranks of O4, O5, and O6, but not to O7.  Officers who 
complete graduate education are more likely to be promoted than officers who do not.  
Having a graduate degree increases the probability of promotion to O4 by 26 percent and 
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to O5 by 10.5 percent.  Cymrot notes that his conclusions are weakened by self-selection 
bias and sample selection bias.    
2. Study by Bowman and Mehay (1999) 
Bowman and Mehay (1999) attempt to correct for the role of selection bias in 
their study “Graduate education and employee performance: evidence from military 
personnel.”  Understanding that the self-selection that an individual exercises and the 
Navy’s selection of competitive-for-promotion individuals into advanced education may 
bias upward the marginal effect of graduate education on performance, the authors use 
models and techniques aimed at eliminating these effects. Like Cymrot, Bowman and 
Mehay use promotion as a proxy for individual performance.  The study uses data from 
the Navy’s Promotion History File merged with fitness report data for all Navy line and 
staff officers considered for promotion to O4 between 1985 and 1990.  The authors group 
explanatory variables into cognitive traits, affective traits and demographic traits:  
Cognitive traits include college GPA, type of undergraduate degree, and graduate 
education; Affective background attributes include the officer’s accession program; and 
Demographic traits include race, gender, and marital status.   Bowman and Mehay 
hypothesize that graduate education is positively related to the probability of promotion 
to O4.   
The authors first use a sequential modeling process.    They utilize a single stage 
probit technique in their first four models.  Each succeeding model increases the number 
of controls in the model to isolate the effect of graduate education on promotion and to 
control for variables that may capture the selection process.  The first model includes 
only demographic traits and graduate education.  The second model adds cognitive traits 
and, while the third model adds affective traits.   
The results indicate that as additional variables are included the marginal effect of 
graduate education on the probability of promotion decreases approximately 40 percent, 
from .980 to .065 and from .145 to .089, for line and staff officers respectively.  The 
authors continue to isolate the impact of graduate education by eliminating the 
unobserved factors that relate both to self-selection bias and competitiveness for 
promotion.  They use bivariate probit analysis and instrumental variables to eliminate 
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these biases.  The results of the bivariate probit analysis indicate that an officer with 
graduate education is .045 to .056 (for line and staff, respectively) more likely to be 
promoted to O4 than officers without graduate education.  The strengths of Bowman and 
Mehay’s research are the correct identification of cognitive, affective, and demographic 
explanatory variables, the use of individual officer fitness report data, and the elimination 
of selection biase.   Although the authors complete a noteworthy analysis, Bowman and 
Mehay’s results may be weakened by using promotion as a proxy for performance 
3. Study by Long (1992) 
In Long’s (1992) master’s thesis “Effect of Variables Independent of Performance 
of Promotion Rates to Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel in the Marine Corps,” 
professional military education is introduced as an explanatory variable. PME is 
measured as a binary variable indicating the completion of appropriate level professional 
military education.  The author uses cross sectional data on officers in-zone for 
promotion to the ranks of O4 through O6 for FY 1986 through FY1982.  Long uses the 
LOGIT function to model the marginal impact of selected explanatory variables on the 
probability of promotion to each respective rank.  He hypothesizes that the completion of 
PME and having a graduate degree make promotion to the next rank more likely than not 
completing PME or not having a graduate degree. Long’s results indicate that the officer 
who completes PME is more likely to be promoted than an officer who does not.  Long’s 
findings concur with Cymrot’s and Bowman and Mehay’s that an officer who completes 
graduate education is more likely to be promoted.   
4. Study by Estridge (1995) 
In his masters thesis “A Comparative Analysis of Promotion Probabilities For 
Marine Corps Field Grade Officers With Special Attention Given to the Graduates of The 
Naval Postgraduate School,” Estridge (1995) introduces a different technique than that 
used by Cymrot, Bowman and Mehay, and Long.  Estridge does, however, continue using 
promotion as a dependent variable to capture individual officer performance.  Estridge 
uses data from the 1993 and 1994 promotion boards to O4 and O5.    His variable of 
interest is graduate education, specifically officers who attended NPS.  Other explanatory 
variables include accession source, MOS, number of personal awards, race, gender, and a 
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“performance index.”  Estridge’s use of the performance index (PI) distinguishes his 
work from that of the other researchers.   
  Estridge develops a PI by first assigning values to each of the 21 individual 
performance attributes of the PES.  The mean values of all observed marks of the 
performance attributes are added together to form the performance index.  The resulting 
PI indicates hyper-inflation of fitness report remarks.  The value of PI ranges from 1 to 
12.    The mean PI for O3’s is 11.78, and the mean PI for O5’s is 11.66, indicating grade 
inflation.  Despite the lack of variation in PI across the sample, the performance index 
proved to have the greatest effect of any variable in Estridge’s model explaining the 
probability of promotion.  This result confirmed his hypothesis that promotion probability 
varies directly with PI.   Additionally, Estridge’s results concur with other researchers 
who have found that graduate education positively impacts the chances of promotion.   
The primary significance of Estridge’s research is the finding that individual officer 
fitness report scores in the form of a performance index is a statistically and practically 
significant variable in explaining performance. 
 5. Study by Roush (1972) 
Roush’s (1972) dissertation “A Study of the Effects of Participation by Marine 
Corps Officers in the Special Education Program on Their Military Performance Ratings” 
introduces the key econometric methodologies used in this thesis.   Roush’s work is the 
earliest attempt to examine the relationship between graduate education and Marine 
officer performance.  The author’s statement of the problem is: “the problem was to study 
and to interpret the effect of participation by Marine Corps officers in the Special 
Education Program on their subsequent performance ratings.”  (Roush, 1972).  He notes 
that the impetus for his work was the unsubstantiated, yet optimistic institutional belief 
that advanced education translates into improved performance in the Marine Corps.   
Roush’s hypotheses include “that military performance ratings for Marine Corps officers 
subsequent to their participation in the Special Education Program differed from military 
performance ratings of officers not participating in the program.”  (Roush, 1972).  The 
data were collected on the 283 officers who participated in or were alternates for SEP 
during the period 1963 through 1968.  The source of data was the Officer’s Selection 
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Board Jacket.  Roush was able to extract military performance ratings for the period in 
question and all data needed to develop selected explanatory variables from this file.   
The author separates the sample of officers into experimental and control groups.  
The experimental group receives treatment, while the control group does not receive 
treatment.  Roush’s control group consists of SEP alternates who did not attend NPS.  His 
experimental group consists of officers who attended NPS.  The treatment in the 
experiment is completing SEP.  Roush’s primary relationship of interest is the effect of 
completing graduate education on the post-treatment performance of attendees.   
In order to model this relationship, the author uses officer fitness report markings 
from the PES to represent individual performance.  Roush uses item 19 of section C to 
represent performance.  
This item purports to be an estimate of the individual's overall value to the 
service.   The evaluation is made with the reference to the rating officer's 
estimates of the overall value to the service of all the officers of the same 
rank whose professional abilities are known to him personally.  (Roush, 
1972).   
Thus, item 19 served as a single comprehensive metric to capture officer 
performance.  The author admits that inconsistencies with the PES, if not corrected, 
would weaken his analysis.  These inconsistencies were hyperinflation of marks by 
Rating Officers and grade inflation attributed to increasing rank.  Roush recognized the 
endemic problem of Rating Officers grading most subordinates as “outstanding” in item 
19, which reduced variation.  Additionally, Roush recognized the trend of increased 
inflation of remarks as rank increased.  To correct for hyperinflation Roush put 
considerable effort into converting all performance data into normalized T-scores.    
...the item 19 marking on each fitness report was assigned a T-score, 
dependent not only on the mark itself, but also on the rank of the officer 
being rated and the time period in which the marking was assigned...scores 
were then weighted according to the number of months [observed]...results 
were expressed as an average T-score per unit of time first from 1960 until 
selected as a participant or an alternate and again , during the period after 
participation or selection as an alternate until 1971.  (Roush, 1972). 
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By normalizing item 19 markings, Roush asserted that his performance variable was a 
consistent, unbiased indicator of officer performance before and after the treatment of 
graduate school.   
Roush analyzes the data using two different methods.  First, he uses analysis of 
covariance single stage classification (ANOVA) technique.  Next, he uses multivariate 
regression analysis.  Roush uses ANOVA to determine the statistical difference in 
performance ratings of the control group and experimental group subsequent to selection 
and non-attendance in SEP or selection and attendance in SEP.   Subsequent military 
performance ratings (post treatment fitness report scores) is the criterion variable.  The 
criterion variable is analyzed with respect to three control variables:  fitness report scores 
before participation in graduate school or selection as an alternate (pre-treatment fitness 
report scores), General Classification Test (GCT) scores, and undergraduate grade point 
average (GPA) scores.  Roush uses multivariate regression to determine if the criterion 
variable, subsequent military performance rating is significantly related to five 
independent predictor variables.  Roush’s a priori hypothesis was that military 
performance ratings following participation in SEP could be explained by pre-treatment 
fitness report scores, GCT scores, undergraduate GPA, SEP GPA, and Basic School class 
standing.   
Roush attains mixed results.  The ANOVA did not support his hypothesis that 
subsequent military performance ratings of SEP graduates and SEP alternates who did 
not attend graduate school were different.  The ANOVA revealed that the difference in 
ratings is statistically insignificant.  Thus, Roush’s analysis shows there is no 
performance difference between officers who attend graduate school and those who do 
not.  The results of the multivariate regression reveals undergraduate GPA, SEP GPA, 
and Basic School class standing are significant predictors.  GCT scores are not significant 
predictors of performance. 
This study borrows from the strengths of Roush’s analytical methodology.   This 
research repeats Roush’s use of longitudinal performance data in the form of fitness 
report markings as the measure of officer performance.   Additionally, the practice of 
using control groups, treatment groups, and (post- and pre-) treatment effects is 
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continued.  We also repeat Roush’s procedure of conducting t-tests for difference in 
means and using the ANOVA to identify differences in performance between treatment 
and control groups.    Roush’s considerable effort to eliminate fitness report inflation is 
the primary reason for using the new Marine Corps fitness report that was introduced in 
1999. 
6. Study by Lloyd (1977) 
Lloyd (1977) continued Roush’s work.  Lloyd was directed by the Marine Corps 
Manpower Management command to determine the impact of attending Amphibious 
Warfare School (AWS), a PME school, on officer performance.  Lloyd’s research was 
identical to Roush’s, but his primary relationship of interest was the impact of AWS on 
subsequent fitness report markings in regular and utilization duties.  Lloyd differentiated 
regular duties as billets that were not specific utilization billets for graduates of the AWS 
course.  Lloyd’s findings indicate that graduates of the AWS had course subsequent 
military markings that were no different from non-graduates in the performance of 
regular duties.  However, Lloyd also finds that graduates of the AWS course attain higher 
fitness report markings when assigned in utilization tours.  The strength of Lloyd’s work 
is the correction of fitness report inflation and the analysis of performance across both 
regular and utilization tours. Lloyd’s finding that graduates of PME courses perform no 
differently than non-graduates in regular duties, and better than non-graduates in 
utilization tours, is significant to this study. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed prior studies that are relevant to this study.  In particular, 
the methodology of Roush (1972), which uses longitudinal performance data and the 
classification of treatment groups, is used as the framework for our statistical analysis. 
Additionally, former studies by Bowman and Mehay (1999), Estridge (1995) and 
Branigan (2001) provide insight into what variables other than graduate education should 
be included in multivariate performance models and should be used to address selection 
bias.  The literature review identifies the strengths of the previous studies for use in our 
















III. PME AND NON-PME GRADUATE EDUCATION 
This thesis compares two populations of Marine officers in order to examine the 
performance effects of graduate level education programs.  We simplify the comparison 
during our quantitative analysis (Chapter V and VI) by categorizing like programs and 
their graduates into one of two categories, PME and Non-PME.  This chapter constructs 
the framework for our categorization of the various Marine Corps graduate programs.  
The framework enables us to compare PME to Non-PME graduate education.  In placing 
officer educational programs into these two categories, some programs were omitted to 
insure that only those programs with similar levels of education, educational objectives, 
or utility to the Marine Corps and individual officer are included in the comparative 
analysis.  Additionally, programs that are placed in either category must not overlap so 
that we can accurately determine the causal effect of each.  The following is a description 
of Marine Corps graduate programs, their purpose and structure, and their categorization 
as either PME or Non-PME. 
A. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME) 
The beginnings of formal Professional Military Education (PME) programs in the 
Marine Corps can be traced back to 1891 when the School of Application was established 
at the Marine Barracks, Washington D.C.  During that time the purpose of formalized 
education for Marine officers was to accomplish little more than provide knowledge for 
young officers to perform their basic duties.  Through the end of World War I the 
structure of officer PME remained unchanged but it was also being used to combat the 
boredom and discipline problems that accompanied the post-war demobilization.  Under 
the guidance of Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General John A. Lejeune, 
officer PME was more clearly focused toward the establishment of a "permanent and 
progressive system of professional military education for its [the Marine Corps'] officer 
personnel." (MCU History, MCUonline, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/History/ 
about.htm).  In the fall of 1919 the Marine Corps' vocational schools opened, establishing 
a new structure and purpose for what would later become the Marine Corps University.  
Today MCU encompasses all officer PME schools and programs.   
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PME includes schools and programs that follow a progression aimed at providing 
an officer "the skills, confidence, understanding, and vision to exercise sound military 
judgment and decision making in battle". (PME Order, MCO P1553.4, Dec 1999).  
Schools become available to officers at specific career points, normally in conjunction 
with promotion, where a higher level of military education is required.  The structure of 
officer PME follows five levels of military education as defined by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCSI 1800.01A, Dec 2000): precommissioning, primary/career, intermediate, 
senior and general level.  At each level PME provides the knowledge and initiates the 
level of analytical thinking necessary to perform the duties and responsibilities of officers 
at that level.  In order to understand comparisons made later in this thesis between 
selected PME and Non-PME programs, it important to first understand why some are 
considered graduate level education and others are not.  
1. Precommissioning Level PME 
At the precommissioning level the focus of PME is to provide a basic 
understanding of the history and culture of the Marine Corps.  Familiarization with the 
levels of war and the Marine Corps' role in each is all that is required for 
precommissioning education.  The main purpose of PME at this level is to introduce the 
culture and doctrine of the Marine Corps to prospective officers in an effort to reinforce 
their interest in becoming Marines.  At this point in a Marine's career, training in 
fundamental tasks and duties plays a larger role than the creative and analytical abilities 
developed through PME. 
PME at the precommissioning level involves only prospective Marine officers; 
that is, candidates who are still participating in indoctrination-training programs and have 
not yet been commissioned in the Marine Corps.  Programs such as the United States 
Naval Academy (USNA), the Marine Corps' Officer Candidate School (OCS), and 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) provide this level of PME.  PME at this career 
point can be considered baccalaureate level education as the institutions and programs 
that provide it are undergraduate programs or available only to undergraduate students.  
In this thesis, precommissioning PME will not be examined.  First, PME at this level is at 
the undergraduate level and therefore it would be inappropriate to make such a 
comparison to Non-PME graduate programs.  Second, the entire population of Marine 
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officers has participated in some type of precommissioning PME hence no comparisons 
can be made.         
2. Primary/Career Level PME 
The second level of military education is the primary/career level.  It is at this 
level that PME is expanded to provide Marine officers with the educational tools to 
assume leadership roles and responsibilities, perform duties in their MOS, and contribute 
to the combat capability of the Marine Corps.  The objectives of primary/career level 
PME are to enhance decision-making ability, develop awareness of joint warfighting, 
improve management and communication skills, and improve proficiency in military 
specialties. (MCO P1553.4, Dec 1999).  Similar to PME at the precommissioning level, 
the scope of PME is specific to the educational needs of the military culture and remains 
primarily at a baccalaureate level.  The difference is that PME programs at the 
primary/career level are provided only in military institutions and not in civilian 
universities. 
The Marine Corps institutions that provide primary/career level PME are typically 
schools that Marine officers attend in the first four years of commissioned service and 
provide knowledge required for the ranks of Second Lieutenant to Captain.  The Basic 
School (TBS) provides the first of these courses.  At TBS the course is "a 6 month, 
primary level course that all second lieutenants attend after commissioning." (MCO 
P1553.4, Dec 1999).  It is during TBS that officers learn the intricacies of the Marine 
Corps culture and the accepted norms in leadership practices, professional demeanor and 
the basics of infantry tactics and weapons systems and their application in maneuver 
warfare doctrine.   
Amphibious Warfare School is the second opportunity for PME for officers in the 
primary/career level.  AWS is a career level school that provides curriculum in residence 
or through distance education program (DEP) that is, correspondence courses.  There is 
no difference in the level of education gained through either resident or non-resident 
AWS; however, the difference between the two is explained later in this chapter.  
Participants of AWS resident or distance education program (DEP) are typically senior 
First Lieutenants or Captains who have completed an initial tour of duty in an operational 
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billet but do not yet have the rank, knowledge or experience to assume intermediate or 
senior level staff positions or responsibilities.  The objective of AWS is to "provide and 
develop skills, knowledge and judgment needed to operate effectively on a Marine 
Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) staff or in a command billet as a captain or major." 
(MCO P1553.4, Dec 1999).  AWS develops a detailed understanding of war fighting 
theory and skills as well as Marine Corps doctrine on use of a MAGTF.  An intended 
outcome of AWS is to sharpen the abilities of mid-grade officers to perform assigned 
duties during combat operations at the tactical level of war.  Although the AWS provides 
more in depth education on Marine Corps doctrine than TBS, it is not considered 
graduate level education.  There is no accreditation of a graduate degree or equivalent 
certification given to graduates of AWS, whether resident or non-resident.  
Within the Marine Corps University, AWS is a school independent of other PME 
schools at the primary/career level of military education.  The resident program resides in 
Quantico, Virginia and is a nine-month school that convenes once a year.  During a 
school year AWS graduates approximately 150 Marine officers who are typically 
between the rank of First Lieutenant and Captain.  A limited number of officers can 
attend resident AWS and that number varies from year to year.  An officer must 
specifically request to attend resident AWS.  Officers who choose not to attend AWS 
resident may complete AWS through the DEP, which consists of a series of 
correspondences courses that mirror the resident school's curriculum.  Officers 
participating in non-resident AWS are not required to finish the course in the same 
amount of time as the resident students.  They are, however, encouraged to complete the 
non-resident course prior to becoming eligible for promotion to major. 
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Unlike precommissioning or primary level PME, participation in AWS is not an 
absolute requirement for Marine officers.  Continuation of PME beyond the 
precommissioning and primary level is strongly encouraged and considered a 
distinguishing trait in officers who are eligible for promotion.  Because completion of 
PME at the career level can be used as a discriminator by promotion boards, the 
completion of AWS (resident or non-resident) has emerged in the culture of the Marine 
Corps as a de facto requirement for promotion to the rank of major.  Law in United States 
Code, Title 10, however, sets only the absolute minimum requirements.  The perception 
by the officer community that career level PME is a requirement for promotion has made 
participation in AWS the common choice; however, it is, in fact, voluntary. 
3. Intermediate Level PME 
It is at the intermediate level that Marine officer PME schools are first considered 
to be graduate level education.  At this level the focus of PME is to develop a greater 
understanding of "employment of larger military units at the operational level of war... 
other service [Army, Navy, Air Force] capabilities, limitations, and doctrines."  Here 
PME departs from the career level as the "emphasis shifts from skill training to 
developing an officer's analytic abilities and critical thinking skills." (MCO P1553.4, Dec 
1999).  The goal of intermediate PME is to prepare officers for higher-level staff and 
command positions.  Similar to graduate education at civilian universities, intermediate 
PME develops cognitive skills and promotes innovative thought and decision-making 
skills. 
The Marine Corps' single intermediate level PME School is the Command and 
Staff College located in Quantico, Virginia.  Officers may choose to attend equivalent 
PME schools administered by other services, which are included in the data.  This study 
focuses only on those operated by the Marine Corps.  The CSC operates two separate 
courses, which are the Command and Staff course and the School of Advanced 
Warfighting course.  The CSC is operated similarly to AWS in that it has a resident and 
non-resident program.  The non-resident correspondence option is only available for the 
Command and Staff course not for SAW.  Participation in CSC is voluntary but strongly 
encouraged for Marine majors who are eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel.  CSC 
is also available to officers from other services, international officers and civilian DoD 
employees.  Marine captains and lieutenants may participate in the non-resident 
Command and Staff course provided a waiver is attained from MCU and PME at the 
career level has been completed, however, this is not part of the normal career 
progression for captains and lieutenants.  The result is small representation of these ranks 
at this level of PME. 
The Command and Staff resident course is a ten-month program that convenes 
once a year and graduates approximately 100 Marine officers.  Officers who participate 
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in this course gain a greater understanding of MAGTF operations at the operational level 
of war as well as the employment of MAGTFs in joint and multinational operations.  
Command and Staff offers incentive for voluntary participation by increasing an officer's 
human capital through education.  The potential benefit is promotion beyond major and 
command opportunities; as with AWS, officers at the intermediate level view 
participation as a de facto requirement for promotion beyond the rank of major.  The 
CSC's intent is to "offer a curriculum of graduate level rigor to educate officers in the 
relationships between...operational and tactical levels of war." (CSC mission, 
MCUonline, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/csc/purpose.htm).  The non-resident course 
mirrors the resident curriculum thereby providing the same human capital-enhancing 
incentive for participation.  While the Marine Corps considers the Command and Staff 
course graduate level education, there is no formal accreditation of a graduate degree for 
either the resident or non-resident programs. 
The School of Advanced Warfighting course differs from the Command and Staff 
course in that it is only available in residence at CSC.  Students who attend this 11-month 
course are selected from officer applicants who have already completed the Command 
and Staff course (resident or non-resident).  Up to 15 Marine officers may attend SAW 
each year.  The purpose of SAW is to provide graduates of the Command and Staff 
course the opportunity to explore the link between the planning and conduct of war by 
analyzing historical cases.   
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The educational objective of SAW is to sharpen analytical and decision-making 
skills.  That objective is met by allowing SAW students to participate in a course of 
instruction that focuses on research techniques; analysis and problem solving that will 
later be used in the writing of a final paper similar to a Master's thesis.  Also, through 
open forum discussions students are offered the opportunity to speak about selected 
topics on military campaigns.  The result of participation in the SAW is the development 
of Marine officers who are able to research, analyze and communicate findings on war 
fighting issues making them better suited to serve in high level Marine Corps, joint or 
multinational staff positions.  Graduates of the SAW course are also conferred a Master's 
degree in Military Studies accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools, Commission on Colleges. 
Because participation in SAW results in the attainment of an accredited Master's 
degree it is one of two PME programs that is most similar to a Non-PME graduate 
school.  However, for the purpose of making a comparison on the performance effects of 
PME graduate programs, the population of SAW is far too small for any credible 
argument to be based.  For the purpose of our comparative study, the Command and Staff 
course and the School of Advanced Warfighting are similar in many respects and 
therefore are both classified as graduate level PME.  Both courses reside under the 
Command and Staff College as intermediate level PME schools and share the same 
mission and intent.  By combining the population of officers who have graduated from 
the Command and Staff course, SAW and other service’s intermediate level PME 
attended by Marine officers, we increase the sample we will use to analyze performance 
and strengthen the reliability of their results.   
4. Senior Level PME        
 The Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) is the second of two PME programs 
that is considered to be graduate education.  As a PME program MCWAR is classified at 
the senior level of PME.  Although it offers a higher level of military education, with 
respect to degree accreditation it is equivalent to the level of education offered by CSC.  
The purpose of MCWAR is "to educate selected senior officers and civilians for decision-
making during war and military operations other than war in a joint, interagency, and 
multinational environment."(MCWAR mission, MCUonline, 
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcwar/mission.htm). The focus of the school is to provide 
senior officers the decision-making skills including the consideration of national military 
strategy, regional strategy, national security policies and objectives, and resources.   
 The Marine Corps operates MCWAR as its senior level PME school but allows 
Marine officers to attend equivalent level schools operated by the other services.  
MCWAR resides in Quantico, Virginia and selects senior officers, typically between the 
ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel.  The size of each class varies but is typically 
between ten and 15 students of which approximately six to seven are Marine officers.  In 
contrast to intermediate level PME programs (i.e., Command and Staff and School of 
Advanced Warfighting) MCWAR confers a Master's degree in Strategic Studies to all 
graduates of the school.  All participants in MCWAR complete a core curriculum and an 
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Independent Research Project similar to a Master's degree thesis.  The Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools, Commission on Colleges also accredits the 
MCWAR degree program.  There is no non-resident option for completing MCWAR and 
hence the officer population that participates in the program is significantly smaller than 
the population in the intermediate and career level PME schools.  Unlike the preceding 
levels of PME, MCWAR is not perceived as a de facto requirement for continued 
promotion and command opportunities; however, like any other PME school it is 
considered a desirable background that may be used as a discriminator at selection 
boards. 
 The Marine Corps War College is very similar to a traditional (i.e., non-military) 
graduate school in its methodology of teaching and the detail and scope of the subject 
matter it covers.  For this reason, the population of officers who have attended MCWAR 
will be included in our comparison of PME programs with Non-PME graduate education 
programs.  As stated earlier, MCWAR is a higher level of PME (i.e., senior level) 
compared to the CSC but it offers an equivalent level degree therefore it is reasonable to 
combine the two populations for the purpose of determining the effects of graduate level 
PME on officer performance.  By combining Intermediate level and Senior level PME we 
again increase the size of our population, which lends to more reliable analysis of the 
performance effect of different types of education. 
5. General Officer Level PME         
The general officer level of PME is the highest level of military education that is 
available.  The focus of PME at this level is on "the highest levels of strategy; integrating 
the components of national power to achieve national objectives." (MCO P1553.4, Dec 
1999).  The objectives of general officer PME are to provide venues for continued 
discussion and analysis of the strategic level of warfare drawing on the knowledge and 
experience of the general officers participating.  PME at this level is considered at or 
above the Master's degree level; however, no formalized degree accreditation has been 
approved for PME schools/programs at the time of this thesis.  Unlike intermediate and 
senior level PME in which participation is voluntary, participation in general officer PME 
is a requirement for those officers selected to general officer. 
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As stated above, this study focuses on the effects on performance of Marine Corps 
operated PME programs that are equivalent to a Master's degree.  PME at the general 
officer level fails to meet these criteria for two reasons and therefore will not be 
considered in the empirical analysis (Chap. V).  First, it is difficult to classify the level of 
education of general officer PME to a degree equivalent such as Baccalaureate, Master's, 
or Doctoral.  In most instances, general officer PME, such as the CAPSTONE course 
conducted by the National Defense University, Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course 
(JFOWC), Flag and General Officer Seminar on Joint Planning, and the Joint Force Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) Course, are simply forums for discussion and sharing 
of knowledge and experience on specific strategic level issues; they have no degree 
equivalency and their duration does not exceed six weeks.  The second reason general 
officer PME will not be considered in our analysis is that of the existing PME programs, 
the Marine Corps operates none fully or in part.  Marine general officers are selected to 
attend the aforementioned PME programs that are operated by different services or 
organizations within the Department of Defense.   
6. Resident and Non-resident PME 
As stated in Marine Corps Order 1553.4, the educational objectives of PME 
include developing "officers educated and skilled in the employment of forces and the 
conduct of war" and "strategic thinkers."  In addition to the level of military education 
characterizing a PME program, the manner in which educational objectives are achieved 
presents a significant distinguishing characteristic of any PME program, whether it is 
resident or non-resident.  For the purpose of this study we have constrained the 
population of officers to only two levels of PME.  The levels chosen are the two that are 
considered to be graduate level education because they offer accredited Master's degrees; 
they are intermediate level PME represented by the Command and Staff College and 
senior level PME represented by the Marine Corps War College.  Only the Command and 
Staff College offers its curriculum to officers through a non-resident, correspondence 
medium.  Officers who have participated in the Command and Staff College, whether 
resident or non-resident, comprise more than three quarters of the population that 
participate in graduate level PME.  It is therefore important to understand the distinction 
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between resident and non-resident PME and potential ramifications of either including or 
omitting the non-resident participants from our analysis. 
The educational objectives of graduate level PME (CSC and MCWAR) are as 
stated above in subparagraphs 3 and 4.  One manner in which goals are achieved is 
through a resident school program where selected officers receive transfer orders to either 
school.  The nature of the orders presents an important difference between attending CSC 
or MCWAR and any other specialized training or school in that they are Permanent 
Change of Station (PCS) orders rather than Temporary Duty (TAD) orders.  When an 
officer attends any specialized training or school where the duration is between 30 days 
and four months, an officer may receive TAD orders depending on the location of the 
school and whether travel away from his permanent duty station is required.  At the 
completion of that school or training program the officer will return to his unit and 
continue serving in his original billet.  Although that time spent at school will not be 
considered in the performance evaluation of his regular duties, it does not detract from it.   
Before attending a resident PME school such as CSC or MCWAR where the 
duration is greater than six months an officer will receive PCS orders, which may require 
him to physically move from his current duty station location.  That officer's performance 
is no longer being evaluated at his previous unit nor will he return to that unit after 
completing resident PME.  During this time an officer's primary duty is to attend and 
successfully complete that PME school.  This is an important distinction because the 
period of time that an officer spends in school is not evaluated in a fitness report.  Periods 
of time not considered a part of an officer's performance evaluation are categorized as 
unobserved time.  It is desirable to minimize the amount of unobserved time an officer 
attains as it may adversely impact his chances of future promotion or duty assignments.  
In the case of TAD orders to attend a school, the accrual of unobserved time may be 
offset by the ability to perform regular duties before and after completion of that school 
at the same unit.  If an officer must leave his unit for resident PME and later go to a 
different unit there may not be continuity in the evaluation of his performance before and 
after he attended resident PME.   
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In addition to the receipt of PCS orders and the accrual of unobserved time when 
attending PME schools in residence, it is important to note that resident PME offers the 
opportunity to learn in a traditional classroom environment.  The methodology of 
teaching in resident PME includes "reading, writing, research, oral presentations, seminar 
discussions, case studies, wargaming, practical application exercises, lectures and films; 
whichever most clearly and effectively conveys the material." (MCO P1553.4, Dec 
1999).  The benefit of resident PME lies not in its methodology but rather in that 
attendance is an officer's primary duty which alleviates the responsibilities of his 
previous operational billet and reduces distractions from the course of study. 
A second means for an officer to attain PME is through a non-resident program, 
often referred to as distance education programs (DEP).  The curricula for the non-
resident PME programs "provide a baseline education that parallels the curriculum 
offered by the resident schools" for all levels of PME up to intermediate PME. (MCO 
P1553.4, Dec 1999).  The non-resident or DEP for the Command and Staff College is 
administered by the Marine Corps Institute which is responsible for the distribution of 
course materials (i.e., books and tests) and the grading of tests and recording of scores 
and completion of PME courses.  Although the curricula are equivalent to that of the 
resident school in scope and objectives, there are two primary differences between non-
resident and resident PME.  First, participation in non-resident PME does not require the 
receipt of transfer orders, either TAD or PCS, nor does it require an officer to leave his 
present duty location.  Likewise, there is no accrual of unobserved time that may detract 
from an officer's record of performance, as he never leaves his current duty assignment.  
The completion of non-resident PME is achieved by the officer's individual efforts during 
off-duty hours allowing him to continue in his regular duties.   
33 
The second characteristic of non-resident PME is the lack of a traditional 
classroom environment.  Non-resident PME does not provide a forum for discussions, the 
use of different media, an instructor or a focused atmosphere uninterrupted by the 
demands of either regular duty during working hours or personal matters during off-duty 
hours.  Officers, on their own initiative, must read the course materials according to no 
set timeline and then take a test proctored by a senior officer at a time and location agreed 
upon by both.  Because completion of non-resident PME is not an officer's primary duty, 
the timeframe for completing non-resident CSC may be several weeks or years.  The 
timetable for non-resident PME completion and the administration of tests are less rigid 
than at a resident PME school.  This difference possibly reduces the quality of the 
education.   
Efforts have been made by the Marine Corps University to provide better learning 
materials, instruction and forums for discussion through the DEP seminar program.  The 
DEP seminar program provides a more structured timetable for completion of non-
resident PME by providing weekly seminars that follow the curriculum and administer 
tests after a course section has been discussed.  The seminar is led by a senior officer 
during off-duty hours, an attempt to replicate the classroom environment provided at 
resident PME schools.  The DEP seminars, however, are strictly voluntary and 
enrollment does not require attendance at the weekly sessions or completion of the 
seminar program.  Although great effort has been expended on making the DEP seminar 
a better learning environment, the same degree of focused study provided at resident 
PME schools can never be attained.   
Because there is such a distinct difference in how PME is administered between 
resident and non-resident programs, it can be argued that the quality of education is 
different and therefore the effects on officer performance are different.  That is a matter 
for further analysis that lies outside of the scope of this study.  It does, however, affect 
our decision to exclude non-resident graduate PME from our study.  For the purpose of 
this study our focus lies primarily on the levels of graduate education.  We assume that 
education programs at the graduate level regardless of method of delivery, share the same 
educational objectives.  However, to avoid deciding on the quality of various PME 
programs this study excludes non-resident PME from the PME category.  Analysis of 
only resident PME and Non-PME graduate programs is conducted.     
B. NON-PME GRADUATE EDUCATION 
Section A. of this chapter described the different levels of PME and how they 
meet their educational objectives.  In an effort to make a logical comparison between 
PME and Non-PME graduate education programs it is important to first understand the 
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composition, objectives and levels of Non-PME education programs and the ways in 
which they are similar to PME at the graduate level (i.e., CSC and MCWAR).   
There are four categories of graduate education programs that the Marine Corps 
allows officers to attend.  The Special Education Program, Advanced Degree Program, 
Law Education Program and Lifelong Learning all offer the opportunity to achieve a 
graduate degree.  They are not part of the PME system of schools/programs and are not 
administered by the Marine Corps University or the Marine Corps Institute.  Participants 
in these graduate programs comprise the population of Non-PME graduates, which will 
be compared to graduate-level PME schools.  The purpose and structure of Non-PME 
programs are significantly different from PME programs primarily due to the lack of a 
single agency that oversees their administration.  Of the Non-PME graduate programs 
none are operated exclusively by the Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.  
Although Non-PME programs are all considered graduate level education, unlike PME, 
they may not share the same method of instruction, curricula or intended utilization 
during an officer's career.  Given the wide variation in the Non-PME education programs 
it is important to understand their similarities and differences. 
1. Special Education Program  
The Special Education Program (SEP) is comprised of two military operated 
schools and Marine Corps approved civilian schools.  Participation in SEP is fully funded 
meaning that an officer continues to receive full pay and allowances and the Marine 
Corps pays all tuition and associated fees.  The purpose of SEP is to educate Marine 
officers to serve in specialized staff positions "...which are required to be staffed by 
officers who possess postgraduate level education."  (MCO 1520.9F, SEP Order, May 
1993).  Each year the Marine Corps establishes a quota for officers selected to attend 
Non-PME graduate education.  Of that quota "Approximately three-fourths of the annual 
quota allocated for postgraduate education are assigned to the SEP." (MCO 1520.9F, SEP 
Order, May 1993).  The remaining officers will attend either ADP or LEP.  Officers 
selected for SEP each year may attend either the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the 
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), or approved civilian universities.     
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NPS is a military graduate school operated by the Department of the Navy at 
Monterey, California.  It is currently the Navy and Marine Corps' principle institution for 
educating officers at the graduate level.  The Marine Corps does not operate NPS but as a 
major stakeholder in the level of education for Marine officers, provides funding to the 
school for research, reimbursement for Marine officer tuition and active duty instructors 
or lecturers.   
The mission of NPS is to "provide relevant and innovative educational 
opportunities to Navy and Marine Corps Officers throughout their careers" and to 
increase "the combat effectiveness of the Navy and Marine Corps. It accomplishes this by 
providing post-baccalaureate degrees...in a variety of sub-specialty areas not available 
through other educational institutions." (NPS mission, NPS online catalog, 
http://www.nps.navy.mil/ofcinst/intro-2.htm). While broad in nature, the mission of NPS 
supports the Marine Corps' goal of educating Marines so they may serve in specific 
billets that require a graduate education.  The intended outcome is officers with greater 
cognitive and analytical skills capable of sound decision-making. 
NPS is strictly a resident program.  Similar to resident PME, Marines receive PCS 
orders and their primary duty is to attend and complete NPS.  During this time a Marine 
will accrue unobserved time in his performance record.  Also similar to resident PME, 
NPS uses a methodology of instruction that incorporates a traditional classroom 
environment, lecture/seminar instruction lead by a Professor or military instructor and the 
most up-to-date presentation media.  Completion of NPS results in Marine officers being 
conferred a Master's degree in one of 31, technical or non-technical disciplines.  In stark 
contrast to graduate level PME, the degree disciplines are tailored toward military 
application but are not specifically military in nature.  For example NPS confers Master's 
degrees in Aeronautical Engineering, Applied Mathematics, Computer Science, Contract 
Management, Systems Management as well as Meteorology; none of these are applicable 
exclusively to the military. 
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the second military-operated 
school in the SEP.  It is operated by the Air Force at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Dayton, Ohio.  Marines who are selected to attend AFIT have their tuition and associated 
36 
educational fees fully funded by the Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps also funds specific 
areas of research conducted at AFIT similar to NPS but to a much lesser extent.     
The focus of AFIT is strictly technical in the curricula it offers to Marine students.  
Its mission and purpose, like NPS, support the Marine Corps' goal of educating officers 
for specific billets.  Also similar to NPS, AFIT is a strictly resident school that Marines 
must receive PCS orders to attend.  They also receive unobserved fitness reports.  It uses 
a traditional classroom environment and lecture/seminar method of instruction in addition 
to laboratory sessions.  Completion of AFIT results in a Master's degree in a technical 
discipline that specifically support a designated Marine Corps billet and like NPS, the 
degrees are specifically chosen for their applicability to Marine Corps operations but are 
not exclusively military in nature. 
The final two programs in SEP allow Marine officers to attend civilian 
universities to attain a graduate degree.  The reason for allowing a civilian education is 
that neither NPS nor AFIT provide degree programs in all disciplines the Marine Corps 
requires for its SEP staff billets.  Per MCO 1520.9F, there are designated billets that must 
be filled by an officer with a graduate degree.  SEP aligns the discipline of the degree 
with the specific needs of the billet.  There are billets that require degrees in law and 
human resources management, neither of which is provided at NPS or AFIT.  Officers 
selected to either the SEP(Law) or Human Resources Management (HRM) program may 
attend a civilian university of their choice subject to approval by Headquarters Marine 
Corps and admission requirements of that school.  Once accepted to a civilian school, the 
Marine Corps will reimburse all tuition expenses and fees relevant to attainment of a 
Master's degree in these two disciplines.  Officers participating in SEP(Law) or HRM 
receive PCS orders to a Marine Corps Detachment nearest the civilian school except in 
the event the school is in the local area of a Marine's current duty assignment.  The 
SEP(Law) and HRM programs require that an officer attend a civilian school as his 
primary duty and that he enroll in the requisite amount of credit hours to maintain a full-
time student status, hence these programs, like NPS and AFIT, are inherently resident.  
While studying at civilian schools officers also accrue unobserved time on their fitness 
report.   
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The focus of the SEP(Law) program is to produce officers who are skilled in 
specific areas of law in support of the Judge Advocate Corps.  The specific areas of law 
which a SEP(Law) participant must concentrate his studies are: international law, 
environmental law, labor law, procurement law, criminal law and law (general).  Officers 
are required to complete all LL.M degree requirements in one calendar year from the date 
the program commences. 
The focus of the HRM program is to prepare officers to serve in billets at Marine 
Corps Family Service Centers.  Officers participating in this program must also enroll in 
the required amount of credit hours to maintain a full-time student status.  They must 
concentrate their studies toward the following areas: human development, management, 
family violence, public policy and government/community relations.     
2. Advanced Degree Program 
The Advanced Degree Program (ADP) provides another means for Marine 
officers to attain a graduate education by attending a civilian university.  The ADP 
augments the number of SEP graduates each year insuring that the Marine Corps 
maintains a sufficient number of officers with graduate degrees to serve in specialized 
billets that require an officer with graduate level education in specific disciplines.  The 
focus of curricula through ADP are outlined in Marine Corps Order 1560.19D and are, 
like SEP, not exclusively military related subjects but are determined to have specific 
applicability to the billets in which the officers will subsequently serve.  ADP shares the 
same objective as SEP, however, it is classified as a completely different program 
because it is considered a partially-funded graduate program.  Through ADP the Marine 
Corps continues an officer's regular pay and allowances and reimburses the cost of 
moving if PCS orders are issued.  However, the individual Marine officer must pay all 
tuition and academic fees. 
Officers who are selected to participate in ADP must meet the admission 
requirements of the civilian school they select.  Attendance at any civilian university is 
restricted only to the extent that the degree attained must be in a discipline that allows 
him to serve in a specific billet.  Although ADP is a partially-funded program, officers 
receive PCS orders requiring that attendance at the school be his primary duty; ADP is 
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considered a resident education program.  Likewise, officers must maintain a full-time 
student status for the duration of the degree program, which may not extend beyond 24 
months.  Officers also accrue unobserved time on their subsequent fitness reports for the 
period of study during ADP.  The intended outcome of ADP is officers with greater 
cognitive, analytical and decision-making skills who have achieved a Master's degree in 
selected technical and non-technical subjects that mirror those offered at NPS.  The 
available subjects that an officer may be selected to attain a degree in will vary each year 
based on the needs of the Marine Corps.         
3. Law Education Program   
The Law Education Program (LEP) is comprised of two different programs, the 
Funded Law Education Program (FLEP) and the Extended Leave Program, Law ELP(L).  
Similar to SEP and ADP, the purpose of LEP is to provide the Marine Corps with 
graduate educated officers to serve in billets that require graduate degrees.  Under LEP 
both law programs are partially funded because the individual officer pays the cost of 
tuition, fees and textbooks.  LEP shares the same overall objective as SEP and ADP but is 
classified as a completely separate program under the Non-PME graduate education 
category.  LEP is distinctly different because participants must attain a Master's degree in 
only one subject, law.  LEP graduates attain a law degree to serve specifically as Marine 
lawyers as part of the Judge Advocate Corps. (LEGADMINMAN, MCO P5800.16A, 
Chap. 19).  Unlike SEP/ADP where there are a variety of specialized billet a graduate 
may serve LEP does not offer a choice.  Completion of LEP also results in a change to 
the officer's primary MOS to Marine Judge Advocate (4402).  This is significantly 
different from the other Non-PME graduate programs.  In the case of ADP/SEP, a 
subsequent tour of duty in a billet that utilizes the graduate degree is required.  However, 
an officer may return to regular duty assignments in his primary MOS after his utilization 
tour and the remainder of his military service may follow the original career path.  For 
LEP participants, officers do not return to duty assignments in their primary MOS, rather, 
4402 becomes their primary MOS and the remainder of their service follows the normal 
career progression of a Marine lawyer.  After the completion of LEP an officer's 
subsequent fitness report will accrued observed time in his new MOS.      
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The Funded Law Education Program (FLEP) is one of two programs that 
comprise the LEP.  It is partially funded by the Marine Corps at a civilian school of the 
Marine officer's choice.  The purpose of the program is to allow selected officers to attain 
a degree in law (LL.M) and change their primary MOS to that of Marine Lawyer.  FLEP 
is a resident program and therefore officers must attend a civilian school full-time as their 
primary duty.  Full pay and allowances are still granted for the duration of FLEP, but 
direct expenses are borne by the individual officer. 
The Extended Leave Program (Law) is the second of two LEP graduate programs.  
It is also partially funded by the Marine Corps and a civilian school administers degree 
requirements.  The difference in this program is that a Marine officer who is selected for 
this program is placed on extended leave and will not draw regular pay and allowances 
for the period he attends school.  There is no reimbursement of any direct costs by the 
Marine Corps for ELP(L).  Officers selected for ELP(L) may receive PCS orders if the 
school of choice is not in the local area of his present unit.  If PCS orders are issued the 
costs associated with transferring location are reimbursed by the Marine Corps.  Once 
travel is complete to the area of the school the officer is relieved of all military duties and 
commitments while on extended leave.   
4. Lifelong Learning 
The final Marine Corps program that may be categorized as Non-PME graduate 
education is the Lifelong Learning program (LLL).  The mission of LLL is "to provide 
personal and professional learning opportunities to the Marine Corps community."  
(MCO 1560.25C).  A secondary purpose of LLL is to act as a retention tool.  In sharp 
contrast to the missions and objectives of the three other Non-PME graduate programs, 
LLL does not intend to produce officers with graduate degrees for service in a specific 
billet or unit.  LLL is voluntary a program aimed at providing educational incentives for 
officers who seek further education as a means to retain them on active duty.  Marines 
can finance the costs participating in LLL with Tuition Assistance (TA).   
TA is available to officers as well as enlisted Marines.  For officers TA may only 
be received for the attainment of Master's or Doctoral degrees.  This program subsidizes 
the cost of tuition up to 75 percent for officers attending civilian graduate schools during 
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off-duty hours.  Unlike ADP, SEP or LEP, participation in LLL and the receipt of TA is a 
non-resident program in that a Marine remains at his current duty assignment.  Marine 
officers must attend graduate courses outside of their military work hours and therefore 
no unobserved time is accrued on fitness reports.  No PCS or TAD orders are issued for 
participation in LLL and transfer of location to attend school is not authorized.  
Participating officers may select any graduate school in the local area of their current unit 
and study any available degree discipline offered by that institution.  Participating in LLL 
and accepting TA obligates a Marine to further service up to two additional years for 
every year TA is received.  The impact of providing TA as a part of the LLL program 
may improve morale and the propensity for a Marine to stay on active duty who 
otherwise might leave the Marine Corps. 
Because LLL compared to ADP, SEP or LEP does not intend to produce an 
officer with a graduate degree for specific use, the impact of this program on an officer's 
performance in his regular duties becomes irrelevant.  In the case of LLL the forces of 
human capital theory still affect both the individual and the Marine Corps.  The 
individual officer may receive some performance benefit through LLL but his decision to 
participate is based on intrinsic motivation to achieve some personal benefit.  Conversely, 
while it may appear the benefit of LLL is solely on the part of the officer who receives 
further education at relatively low cost the Marine Corps reaps the benefit of retaining 
that officer on active duty thus avoiding the cost of recruiting and training another 
Marine.  If the Marine who participates in LLL achieves a degree the Marine Corps may 
also benefit by his potentially higher productivity.  Regardless, the Marine Corps retains 
the Marine on active duty the moment TA is received thereby achieving the goal of LLL.   
When comparing Non-PME graduate programs to PME graduate programs, it is apparent 
the objectives of LLL and the manner in which it is administered are so significantly 
different from either category that including LLL in our comparative analysis may 
introduce effects not germane to this study.  For this reason LLL is omitted from the 
Non-PME graduate education category.    
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the two major categories of education available to 
Marine officers as PME and Non-PME.  The chapter establishes why various education 
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programs are classified as PME or Non-PME.  A description of which Marine Corps 
programs are included in our two categories is provided to ensure congruence of program 
mission/purpose and utilization of graduates in each.  Programs included in either 
category remain mutually exclusive, avoiding the problems of evaluating the effects of 
several programs on one officer. 
 The common characteristic of the PME and Non-PME schools in our study is that 
a graduate education is attained and may result in the receipt of a Master's degree.  By 
classifying Marine Corps education programs into these two groups this chapter 
considers similarities in each program with regard to the level of education and the 
general content of the areas of study.  The principle difference between PME and Non-
PME is that the disciplines in which PME confers a graduate education are all military in 
nature (e.g. warfighting theory, doctrine, planning or execution) and therefore are specific 
education which may influence officer performance immediately.  Conversely, Non-PME 
graduate programs provide an education in disciplines that have some military 
application but may not be specifically military in nature (e.g. management, aeronautical 
engineering, computer science) and are therefore general education, which may also 
affect performance either immediately or long term.   
 
42 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM 
The preceding chapters of this thesis categorize Marine Corps education programs 
as PME and Non-PME.  Within those two categories, certain programs were excluded to 
avoid potential bias from the effects of incongruent education programs.  This chapter 
describes our metric for analyzing PME and Non-PME graduate programs.  Our 
description draws on the strengths and addresses weaknesses of similar metrics used in 
prior studies reviewed in Chapter II.  This study uses the Marine Corps Performance 
Evaluation System and its primary component, the fitness report, as the metric to 
compare the effects of PME and Non-PME graduate education on officer performance.  
A. FITNESS REPORT 
The U.S. Marine Corps presently operates a single medium for "reporting, 
recording, and analysis of the performance and professional character of Marines". (MCO 
P1610.7E, Dec 1998).  This is the Performance Evaluation System, which employs the 
fitness report (fitrep) as the means to accomplish the stated purpose.  The objectives of 
the PES, however, are not accomplished solely through the fitrep but rather through a 
series of actions taken by officers charged with using the fitrep to evaluate a subordinate's 
performance. 
The objectives of the PES are, first, the completion of an accurate fitrep that 
evaluates the performance of a Marine officer, referred to hereafter as the Marine 
Reported On (MRO).  A fitrep is completed periodically for all officers up to the rank of 
major general by officers senior in rank or position and in the immediate chain of 
command.  Occasion for completion of a fitrep occurs, at a minimum, once a year during 
a designated month according to rank of the MRO.  Marine officers who are responsible 
for the evaluation of another's performance are the Reporting Senior (RS) and the 
Reviewing Officer (RO).  The RS and RO are the senior officers in the chain of 
command in the two immediate superior levels above the MRO.  The evaluation of a 
Marine by both the RS and RO insures that the fitrep accurately reflects the performance 
of an officer in his assigned duties given the established set of requirements for his 
position/billet.     
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The second objective of the PES is the prevention of inflation in fitness report 
grades.  The fitness report consists of four sections that allow the RS and RO to grade the 
MRO on 14 performance items.  The attributes are divided into four groups: mission 
accomplishment, individual character, leadership, and intellect and wisdom.  The grades 
assigned to each item range from 'A', which represents the lowest level to 'G', which 
represents the highest level of proficiency.  An example of a fitness report, the different 
graded items and the grading spectrum for each is shown in Appendix A.   
Grade inflation may result when either the RS or RO do not objectively evaluate a 
Marine's performance.  Prevention of inflated grades is accomplished by requiring that 
reporting officials complete fitreps based only on "fact and...objective judgments based 
on Marine Corps standards; not conjecture." (MCO P1610.7E, Dec 1998).  The fitness 
report also includes a section below each attribute's grade where the RS must provide a 
narrative justification for grades of A(the lowest), F or G(the highest).  The design of this 
report limits the ability of an RS to grade an MRO at the lowest level (A) or the two 
highest levels (F and G) without some substantive rationale or specific examples.  The 
result is a fitrep that effectively reduces grading inflation or deflation.  In some cases 
where the RS or RO have not had the opportunity to observe an MRO demonstrate, in the 
performance of his duties, any level of proficiency for a particular attribute, a grade of 
(H) may be given.  The grade (H) represents "not observed" and does not require a 
justification statement.  It does, however, prevent the RS from making an assumption 
about an MRO's proficiency in an area that was not specifically observed and thereby 
also prevents the possibility of inflation or deflation.  Finally, the current fitness report 
assigns a relative value for the summed total of all graded attributes to help reduce the 
inflation.  The relative value for a fitness report is a numerical grade that is calculated for 
all graded traits and summed to provide a single numeric grade.  That grade is then 
compared to the average numeric grade given by the RS on all previously written fitness 
reports.  Through this comparison a relative value may be assigned to a fitness report that 
takes into consideration the reporting trends, whether high or low, for an RS thereby 
reducing inflation.       
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Other objectives of the PES are the timely completion and submission of fitness 
reports by reporting officials to the Manpower Management Support Branch at 
Headquarters Marine Corps.  Timely refers to the completion of a fitrep and submission 
to Headquarters Marine Corps within 30 of the end of the reporting occasion in which the 
MRO's performance is being evaluated.  Completeness and administrative correctness of 
fitreps are the remaining objectives of the PES.  Completeness refers to having all 
sections of a fitness report completed or providing an explanation why an omission 
occurred.  Administrative correctness refers to assuring that all information that identifies 
the MRO, RS, RO and relevant command is correct thereby insuring that the record of a 
Marine's performance is properly and quickly entered into his Official Military Personnel 
File (OMPF) at Headquarters Marine Corps.  All involved parties (i.e., MRO, RS and 
RO) achieve these objectives of the PES only through the specific compliance with 
policy and administrative procedure outlined in Marine Corps Order P1610.7E, 
December 1998. 
The intended uses of the PES are to support centralized selections of officers for 
all Marine Corps education programs, promotion, retention, duty assignments and other 
personnel management decisions.  General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine 
Corps stated the significance of the PES and the fitreps as follows: 
The completed fitness report is the most important information component 
in manpower management.  It is the primary means of evaluating a 
Marine's performance.  The fitness report is the Commandant's primary 
tool available for the selection of personnel for promotion, retention, 
augmentation, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments.  
Therefore, the completion of this report is one of an officer's most critical 
responsibilities.  Inherent in this duty is the commitment of each reporting 
senior and reviewing officer to ensure the integrity of the system by close 
attention to accurate marking and timely reporting. Every officer serves a 
role in the scrupulous maintenance of this evaluation system, ultimately 
important to both the individual and the Marine Corps.  Inflationary 
markings only serve to dilute the actual value of each report, rendering the 
fitness report ineffective.  Reviewing officials will not concur with 
inflated reports.  (MCO P1610.7E, Dec 1998).    
The presence of such strong policy and attention to the integrity of the PES make 
it the best measure for evaluating an officer's performance.  For this reason, our analysis 
will use a quantifiable performance index (PI) derived from the graded items from the 
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fitness report as our metric for determining the effects of PME and Non-PME graduate 
education on officer performance.  
B. PERFORMANCE INDEX 
1. The Fitness Report Performance Measure 
As described in Chapter II of this thesis, the studies by Roush (1972), Lloyd 
(1977), Estridge (1995) and Branigan (2001) recognized the benefits of using a 
performance index derived from officer fitness reports.  This study uses the same 
rationale in developing a PI by quantifying the letter grades on a fitrep into a numeric 
scale that is then consolidated into a single score per fitrep per officer.  The rationale for 
this choice is that, to determine the performance impact of a particular treatment, in this 
case a graduate program, a common metric of performance is necessary.  The more 
accurately the selected metric reflects the true performance of an officer, the more 
accurately the effects of a given treatment can be determined. 
Although we recognize the accuracy of the fitness report and the performance 
index derived from it we also are aware that it is not without limitations.  First, the fitness 
report currently being administered under the PES consists of 14 graded items and while 
the grading scale for each of those attributes can easily be converted to a numeric scale 
and summed (or averaged) to produce a performance index, some of those attributes lack 
reasonable applicability to the effects of education, graduate or otherwise.  For example, 
the fitrep includes in Section E.1., the attribute of 'courage'.  Courage is defined as: 
Moral and physical strength to overcome danger, fear, difficulty or 
anxiety.  Personal acceptance of responsibility and accountability, placing 
conscience over competing interests regardless of consequences.  
Conscious, overriding decision to risk bodily harm or death to accomplish 
the mission or save others.  The will to persevere despite uncertainty. 
(MCO P1610.7E, Dec 1998) 
Courage represents an intrinsic characteristic that compels an officer to achieve 
given missions and objectives and risk personal peril in doing so.  Courage is a subjective 
attribute that is not easily quantified by any grading scale.  Further, the correlation 
between courage and education may be weak.  Therefore, to include the courage score in 
the performance index used to measure effects of graduate programs would detract from 
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the validity of the performance index.  For this reason, not all of the 14 graded attributes 
presented in the fitness report are included in the performance index.  Our performance 
index consists of only those attributes that are most logically associated with the effects 
of graduate education or supported through previous studies.  A complete description of 
included attributes and the rationale supporting their inclusion is given below in Chapter 
V.        
2. Other Performance Measures 
Prior studies of the effects of graduate education have used other performance 
measures.  A metric such as officer promotion has been used effectively in the past and is 
accepted as a valid proxy for officer performance.  The rationale for using promotion as a 
proxy is supported by the precepts that govern the conduct of any promotion board and 
the Marine Corps Promotion Manual.   
The Promotion Manual states that officers are "selected for promotion for their 
potential to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the next higher grade based upon 
past performance as indicated in their official military personnel file [OMPF]."  The 
OMPF is the principle source of information on an officer that may be considered 
according to law established in U.S. Code, Title 10, Sections 576, 615, 14106, and 14107.  
Marine Corps policy states accordingly "The primary source of information furnished to 
a selection board is the OMPF which contains fitness reports, awards, and other 
information". (MCO P1400.31B, Feb 2000).  Given that consideration for officer 
promotion is primarily based on information contained in the OMPF of which fitreps are 
a part, it is reasonable to conclude that promotion is a function of performance.  The 
relationship between officer performance and promotion is further validated by the 
guidance levied through the promotion board precept.   
A promotion board precept is a legal document sent from the Secretary of the 
Navy that appoints the President of the Promotion Board that provides guidance for 
selection of board members, and gives instructions on the conduct of the board and 
factors that should be considered when recommending a particular officer for promotion.  
According to the guidance set forth in the promotion board precept, officer performance, 
as reflected in his OMPF, is the most important factor for consideration.  Thus, the 
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precept supports the validity of the assumption that promotion is a function of officer 
performance.   
For the reasons stated above, promotion has become a widely accepted proxy for 
measuring Marine officer performance.  However, promotion has some inherent 
weaknesses.  The weakness of the promotion proxy is that it includes the effects of other 
factors that may not be associated with officer performance.  These other factors include :  
Primary and/or secondary MOS, billet assignments, time spent in operational (combat) 
units, time in service, time in grade, and selection zones.  Information on these factors 
resides in an officer's OMPF and is considered in the promotion board process.  
However, these factors may not accurately reflect performance.  For example, a Marine's 
primary MOS or choice to obtain a secondary MOS early in his career can impact his 
promotion potential.  Promotion board precepts give special consideration to officers in 
an MOS that has a "critical shortage."  Hence, an officer's selection of MOS may offer 
some advantage in promotion regardless of performance. 
Factors such as time in service, time in grade and selection zones also impact 
whether one officer is selected for promotion.  If an officer does not possess the required 
amount of time in service or grade, he may not fall within the promotion zone (i.e., the 
eligible population of officers considered for promotion) for a given promotion board.  
Finally, factors such as assignment to a variety of billets such as operational (combat) 
units, joint duty or staff billets are given special consideration, as the experience gained 
in those billets is a desirable trait considered by promotion boards: "When reviewing an 
officer's qualifications for the next higher grade, you [the promotion board] should 
consider that the Marine Corps benefits when the officer corps possesses a broad 
spectrum of experiences."  (SECNAV, Precept Convening a Selection Board, Oct 2002).  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To provide the most credible metric for comparing the performance of PME and 
Non-PME graduates this study relies on a performance index derived from the graded 
attributes on fitness reports.  This chapter describes the rationale and utility of a 
performance index and is supported by policy and practice of the Marine Corps in 
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evaluating officer performance.  Some of the limitations that using a proxy as the metric 
for comparison may present are also addressed.      
The fitness report is the most effective means to evaluate performance.  By using 
numerical scores of graded items on fitreps this study can quantify performance 
differences between different populations of officers.  We expect this metric to provide a 
more reliable indicator of performance differences than one based on promotion.  The 
fitness report attributes used in the formulation of our performance index and the 
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V. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
A. DATA 
1. Sources 
The sources of data are the USMC Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) the 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and the Office of the Registrar, Naval Postgraduate 
School.  Figure 2 below represents the individual files that were merged by social 














Figure 2.   Sources of Data 
 
The primary source for demographic and career data was the Marine Corps 
Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) file provided by CNA. The 
primary source for new fitness report data was TFDW.  The NPS Registrar file was used 
to determine the officers who graduated from SEP.  The officers who graduated from 
CSC, MCWAR, and ADP were identified in TFDW.   There are 994 officers observed in 
the study, who received 5,577 new fitness reports during the 1999-2001 period.  
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2. Collection and Manipulation 
Our data collection and manipulation methods are based on the research of Roush 
(1972) and Lloyd (1977).  Data were collected to facilitate the observation of 
performance before and after graduate education as shown in Figure 3 below.   The 
observation period from JAN 99 to JAN 03 was chosen because the new fitness report 
system, which is purported to be a more accurate measure of performance, became 
mandatory for use beginning JAN 99.  For this reason the observation period extends for 
only four years.  
 








OBSERVATION FOR PME AND NON-PME
(NOT SAME FOR EACH OFFICER )
 
Figure 3.   Time Period of Data Collected for Graduate Programs  
 
Data were collected on consecutive observations of the same officer with respect 
to performance and other explanatory variables.  Data were formatted in cross sectional 
files.  We chose to format the data in this form to facilitate testing the different 
multivariate models (discussed later in Chapter VI).   
Fitness report data, demographic data, and career data on three groups of officers 
were collected within the time period constraint of JAN 99 to JAN 03.  Two “treatment 
groups” were established -- all officers who graduated from PME (PME group) between 
JAN 99 and JAN 03, and all officers who graduated from Non-PME graduate school 
(Non-PME group) between JAN 99 and JAN 03.  Although graduation date is not the 
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same for every officer in our data, in all cases the officers observed have at least one 
fitness report that occurs before they attended graduate school and at least one that occurs 
after.  A control group or “comparison group” was established -- a random sample of 
officers who, between JAN 99 and JAN 03, attended neither PME nor Non-PME 
graduate school.  This group is referred to as the “No School Group” or NOS group.  
The establishment of the NOS group was required as a base case to conduct the 
comparative analysis between PME and Non-PME officers.  The primary focus of this 
study remains comparing the effects of PME graduate education and Non-PME graduate 
education on officer performance, but comparing these cases to a group having no 
advanced education will provide a baseline of the effects of both types of educational 
treatment.  The use of a comparison group is standard in program evaluation research. 
All officers are categorized into one of these groups.  Officers who attended both 
PME and Non-PME programs were removed from the data set to ensure no overlapping 
of groups.  All officers across the three groups (PME, Non-PME, and NOS) have fitness 
reports for the entire 4-year duration.  Tables 1 and 2 below provide frequencies of 
officer groups and rank.  
  
Group Frequency Percentage 
PME 364 36.62 
Non-PME 132 13.28 
NOS 497 50.00 
 
Table 1.   Frequency of Officers in Groups in Sample (N=994) 
 
 
Rank Frequency Percentage 
O2 1     .10 
O3 350 35.21 
O4 421 42.35 
O5 217 21.83 
O6 5     .50 
 




 3. Treatment Point 
The ‘treatment point’ is the demarcation point used to determine the period of 
observation before treatment (graduate education) and the period of observation after 
treatment.  For the PME and Non-PME groups, the treatment point is the time spent 
during the respective graduate program.  The before and after periods for the treatment 
groups were determined by identifying the fitness reports before attendance at PME or 
Non-PME graduate school and those after attendance.  Table 3 illustrates the before and 
after periods for a hypothetical officer who attends PME or Non-PME graduate school.  
 
      YEAR      SSN  COMMAND  PERFORMANCE 
1)   1999 111 22 3333  HMM 165  fitness report marks 
2)   2000 111 22 3333  HMM 165  fitness report marks 
3)   2001 111 22 3333  NAVAL PGS  unobserved report 
4)   2002 111 22 3333  MANPOWER  fitness report marks 
5)   2003 111 22 3333  USS TUB  fitness report marks 
 
Table 3.   Hypothetical ‘Before’ and ‘After’ Fitness Report Periods for PME and Non-
PME Officer 
 
As illustrated in Table 3, fitness reports are available for the period covering 1999 
to 2003.  The highlighted fitness report in Table 3 is an unobserved report from attending 
SEP, the Naval Postgraduate School.  Thus, the officer is categorized in the Non-PME 
group.  The ‘before’ fitness reports are reports 1 and 2.  The after fitness reports are 4 and 
5.  This technique of dividing time into ‘before’ and ‘after’ periods with respect to the 
treatment point was repeated for all officers within the Non-PME group and the PME 
groups.   
The treatment point for the NOS group was identified as follows.  Because the 
control group, NOS, received no treatment it was necessary to create a convention that 
would divide NOS officer fitness reports into ‘before’ and ‘after’ time periods.  Figure 4 
below illustrates this convention. 
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JAN 1999 JAN 2001JAN 2000 JAN 2002 JAN 2003
MIDWAY POINT OF AVG EARLIEST AND LATEST 







Figure 4.   Determining ‘Before’ and ‘After’ Period for NOS Officers 
 
To maintain uniformity between the NOS and PME/Non-PME treatment period, 
the average earliest starting period of observation on all fitness reports and the average 
latest ending period of observation on all fitness reports was determined. The time 
between average earliest and average latest fitness report dates was divided in half. This 
midway point in time was identified as 10 JUL 2000, which became the separation point 
between before and after performance for the NOS group. Once this date was determined 
for the NOS group, the three groups could be treated similarly with respect to ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ periods.  Table 4 below is an example record of a hypothetical NOS officer; 
the ‘before’ period includes periods 1 and 2 while the ‘after’ period includes periods 4 
and 5.  Keeping consistent with the convention for creating a ‘before’ and ‘after’ period 
for NOS officers, the fitness report for period 3 is deleted from the record. 
 
   SSN         COMMAND     DATE  PERFORMANCE 
1) 222 33 4444 HMM 233 17 DEC 1999  fitness report marks 
2) 222 33 4444 HMM 233 23 MAY 2000  fitness report marks 
3) 222 33 4444 3MAW 10 JUL 2000    fitness report marks 
4) 222 33 4444 3MAW 20 DEC 2001  fitness report marks 
5) 222 33 4444 3MAW 01 JAN 2003  fitness report marks 
 
Table 4.   Hypothetical ‘Before’ and ‘After’ Fitness Reports for NOS Officers 
4. Performance Index 
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The formulation of our performance index was based on the research of Estridge 
(1995) and Branigan (2001).  After dividing the four-year observation period into before 
and after periods for PME, Non-PME, and NOS, the variable of interest “performance” 
was calculated.  First, performance index (PI) was defined.  Note that the alphabetical 
grading system of A thru H used in the new fitness report was first converted to a 
corresponding numerical grading system.  Thus, the markings in the respective categories 
range from 1 (the lowest) to 7 (the highest).  PI is the summation from one fitness report 
of the markings in the communication skills, decision-making ability, initiative, 
performance, proficiency, judgment, and developing subordinates categories.  Scores are 
then divided by 7 to obtain the PI for each fitness report.    In all fitness reports used for 
the analysis, officers were graded in all seven of the selected performance attributes.  The 
calculation is illustrated in the following equation. 
For officer i in period t 
 
PIit    =    Σ(communication skills, decision making ability, initiative, 
       performance, proficiency, judgment, developingsubordinates) 
 
              7 
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The greatest possible value of PI for one fitness report is 7 and the lowest possible 
value is 1.  As previously noted in Chapter IV, the reason for choosing the seven specific 
performance attributes was that they are the most likely attributes to be impacted by 
advanced education, either PME or Non-PME.  We omitted courage, effectiveness under 
stress, leading subordinates, ensuring the well being of subordinates, and setting example 
because they are unlikely to be affected by either program.  The relative value scores on 
fitness reports could not be used in the analysis.  Relative value is determined by 
comparing the Marine Report On fitness report score to the Reporting Seniors cumulative 
average.  The RS’s cumulative average includes all 14 performance attributes.  Using any 
metric that is not based exclusively on the seven selected items would incorporate 
performance elements that are not likely to be affected by graduate school.   The potential 
benefit gained by using a relative value PI, however, is not lost in our selection of seven 
traits.  The strength of the new fitness report is that it significantly reduces grade 
inflation, which results in a normal distribution of PI for the officers in the sample.  
Descriptive statistics for PI, which include all three groups (PME, non-PME and NOS) 
and excludes any unobserved fitness reports, are indicated Table 5.  A comparison of the 
mean value (4.360) and the median value (4.428) of PI indicates that its distribution is 
approximately normal across the sample. 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard deviation 
PI 1.0 7.0000 4.3601 4.4286 .9273 
 
Table 5.   Measures of Central Tendency and Variation of PI 
 
The record shown in Table 6 below is for a Non-PME officer.  Notice that the PI 
for time at NPS is zero because the fitness report was unobserved.  Unobserved fitness 
reports were deleted from all officers’ records and not included in calculations of the 
performance index.   Additionally, all officers who experience a grade change during the 
four-year observation period are excluded from the analysis. 
 
SSN   COMMAND   PI 
1) 131 23 6789  HMM 165   4 
2)  131 23 6789  HMM 165   4 
3)  131 23 6789  NAVAL PGS   0 
4)  131 23 6789  MANPOWER   6 
5)  131 23 6789  USS TUB   6 
 
 











a.) avgPIbefore  =      Σ (PI before) 
                                                 n before 
 
 
b.) avgPIafter  =     Σ (PI after) 
             n after 
 
 
  c.) avg∆PI    =   avgPIafter – avgPIbefore 
 
Definitions (a) and (b) show the average PI before and after the PME or Non-
PME treatment.  For example in Table 6 the officer earns an avgPIbefore of 4.0 and an 
avgPIafter of 6.0 after Non-PME graduate education.  Thus the difference, (c) avg∆PI is 
2.0.  The above variables were calculated for every officer in the entire sample (PME, 
Non-PME, NOS) and within each group respectively.  Table 7 below is an example of the 
result of performance data after conducting the described procedures. The records of four 
officers are depicted.  Each officer is a single observation identified by social security 
number.  For each officer the three performance indices are calculated and the group to 
which the officer belongs is indicated.   
 
OBS     avgPIbefore          avgPIafter   avg∆PI GROUP  
111 22 3333                4          6     2  PME 
222 33 4444  7                              5                -2  NOS   
333 44 5555  3                     7                 3            Non-PME 
555 66 7777                4                     6                 2            Non-PME 
 
Table 7.   Example of Officer Records with Performance Data 
 
Of the three performance indexes avgPIafter and avg∆PI are used as the dependent 
variables to represent performance in determining the effects of graduate education on 
performance.  These two indexes are the most useful of the three in explaining 
performance subsequent to the treatment point.  The strength of avgPIafter is that it does 
not include any performance prior to the treatment.  It allows our analysis to accurately 
determine performance after a particular treatment without introducing the effects of 
differences in performance before the treatment.  The strength of avg∆PI is that it 
58 
measures the change in performance experienced by an officer, regardless of group.  The 
avg∆PI provides a frame of reference for which to assess the effect of graduate education 
on performance regardless of differences in average performance between groups in our 
sample.                         
After calculating the performance indices, the performance data set was merged 
with demographic, cognitive, and career data from the MCCOAC file.  This provided the 
data set used for analysis.   
B. HYPOTHESES 
 The goal of this study is to determine the effect of Marine Corps graduate 
education on officer performance.  To this end the analysis attempts to answers our 
research questions by testing three hypotheses.  Figure 5 below depicts the research 
questions and hypothesis testing logic. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1
IS PERFORMANCE ‘AFTER’ GREATER 
THAN PERFORMANCE ‘BEFORE’ 
WITHIN GROUPS?
HYPOTHESIS 2
IS PERFOMANCE ‘AFTER’ DIFFERENT
ACROSS GROUPS?
HYPOTHESIS 3









Figure 5.   Hypothesis Testing Logic 
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Testing hypothesis 1 will answer the question if performance ‘after’ the treatment point is 
greater than performance ‘before’ in all three groups.  Our first hypothesis is that the 
measure of performance after graduate education, whether PME or Non-PME, will be 
greater than performance before.  The a priori hypothesis, based on prior studies, is that 
advanced education improves on-the-job performance.  Hypothesis 1 is stated below. 
Hypothesis 1 
Ho :   avgPIafterPME/Non-PME/NOS = avgPIbefore PME/Non-PME/NOS 
HA :   avgPIafter PME/Non-PME/NOS > avgPIbefore PME/Non-PME/NOS 
 
Following our logic, the next question asks whether performance subsequent to 
the treatment point differs across the groups PME, Non-PME, and NOS.  In answering 
this question we conduct our first comparative analysis of the effects of graduate 
education on performance across the groups.  Hypothesis 2 is that performance after the 
treatment point across the three groups is not equal: 
Hypothesis 2 
Ho :   avgPIafter PME  = avgPIafter Non-PME =  avgPIafterNOS 
HA :  avgPIafter PME  ≠  avgPIafter Non-PME  ≠   avgPIafterNOS 
 
Ho :   avg ∆PIPME  = avg∆PINon-PME =  avg ∆PINOS 
HA :  avg ∆PIPME  ≠  avg∆PINon-PME ≠   avg ∆PINOS  
 
As stated earlier, our analysis of the effects of graduate education on performance will be 
tested using both avgPIafter and avg∆PI as variables explaining performance.  
Our final question to be answered is, given that performance after the treatment 
point across groups is different, how does the ‘after’ performance of each group compare 
to one another.  Answering this question by testing hypothesis 3 directly compares the 
effect of PME and Non-PME graduate education on performance.  This is the main focus 
of our thesis.   
The cultural perception, described in Chapter I, asserts that PME graduate 
education provides greater benefits to an officer.  However, our practical experience and 
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recent data on the 2002 Lieutenant Colonel and Major promotion rates, shown in Table 8, 
suggest that non-PME graduate education may provide greater benefits to an officer.  In 
Table 8, the Non-SEP category includes all who do not attend SEP (i.e., PME and NOS 
officers by our grouping criteria). 
 
 LtCol Selection Rate (%) Major Selection Rate (%) 
SEP 68.1 94.9 
Non-SEP 65.2 87.3 
Board Average 65.7 88.0 
Source:  Headquarters Marine Corps, Personnel Management Division website,  
(https://osprey.manpower.usmc.mil/promotion+selection+rates+sep+officer) 
accessed September 2002. 
Table 8.   FY 2002 Selection Rates for Promotion to LtCol and Maj 
 
Thus our a priori reasoning, which may be counter to the current Marine Corps 
perception, is that Non-PME, or traditional graduate education, has a greater impact on 
performance than PME education.  Hypothesis 3 is stated below:  
Hypothesis 3 
Ho :   avgPIafterNon-PME  =  avgPIafterPME   
HA :  avgPIafterNon-PME  > avgPIafterPME  
 
Ho :   avg∆PINon-PME  = avg∆PIPME  
HA :  avg∆PINon-PME  > avg∆PIPME    
       
 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF MEANS 
1. Analysis Within Groups 
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Our preliminary analysis begins with an analysis of means of the performance 
indices within groups, a technique borrowed from Roush (1972) and Lloyd (1979).  
Tables 9 provides descriptive statistics on the PI variable by treatment group.   
 
Group avgPIbefore avgPIafter 
Difference in means 
avgPI before and 





PME 4.41 4.88 .475*** 10.8 8.54 
Non-PME 4.18 4.41 .228*** 5.45 2.58 
NOS 4.04 4.44 .399*** 9.87 11.80 
Comparisons significant at the .001 level are indicated by*** 
N = 994. 
Table 9.   Performance Indices within Groups  
 
Table 9 provides evidence that supports the first hypothesis that performance after 
the treatment point is greater than performance before.  In a one sided t-test between 
before and after average PI within the groups the difference in means is statistically 
significant.  Thus, for officers who attend PME and Non-PME graduate education 
performance ‘after’ is greater than performance ‘before.’  The same case holds true for 
the NOS group.  The analysis also reveals that the difference (avg∆PI) between the 
means values of performance ‘before’ and performance ‘after’ within groups is positive 
and statistically significant.  All groups realize a positive increase in performance across 
the four-year period.  The PME group attains a 10.8 percent increase across the 
observation period, the Non-PME group a 5.45 percent increase and the NOS group a 
9.87 percent increase. 
From the results of the preliminary analysis in Table 9 we can infer that 
performance subsequent to the treatment point (graduate school or no graduate school) is 
greater than before. Therefore, we reject the null in hypothesis 1.  We can also infer that 
all groups of officers exhibit a positive change of performance across the observation 
period.  The results of the preliminary analysis within groups does not definitively prove 
or disprove that the above inferences in the cases of the PME and Non-PME groups are 
due in part or in whole to graduate education.  The trend may be the natural progression 
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of increased performance, as indicated by the NOS group, and explained by added 
military experience. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter III, an officer’s rank is operative in determining 
the treatment of graduate education.  PME level graduate education is offered primarily at 
the rank of O4 and above.  Because compulsory primary level PME (TBS), and MOS 
schooling occurs early in an officer’s career, officers are more likely to attend Non-PME 
graduate education after the ranks O2 and O3.  Thus, due to the career timing of graduate 
education in the Marine Corps, there is an unequal distribution of education programs 
within each rank.  This distribution is illustrated in Table 10. 
 
Group O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 
PME 0 3 160 196 5 
non-PME 1 72 58 1 0 
NOS 0 275 202 20 0 
 
Table 10.   Distribution of Rank within Groups 
 
The greatest representation of ranks occurs with respect to a group at O3, O4 and O5.  
We see that the rank that has the best representation across the three groups is O4.  In 
light of this fact we address the disparity of rank distribution in our preliminary analysis 
by conducting a difference in means t-test but controlling for rank at O4. Table 11 below 
presents the results of the test.   
 
Group avgPIbefore avgPIafter
Difference in means 
avgPI before and 





Non-PME 4.30 4.69 .391*** 9.10 2.92 
PME 4.41 4.71 .309*** 7.00 4.18 
NOS 4.44 4.72 .289*** 6.50 5.30 
Comparisons significant at the .001 level are indicated by *** 
N = 421. 
Table 11.   Performance Indices within Groups for O4 
 
The results of the repeated one sided t-test reveal the same trends of performance 
‘after’ the treatment point being greater than performance ‘before’ and a positive net 
increase in performance across the observation period within all three officer groups.  
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The analysis of means when controlling for group and rank, however, provides stronger 
evidence that the positive change in performance that occurs in the PME and Non-PME 
groups is due to participation in graduate education.  Controlling for rank within O4 has 
removed the potential upward bias rank could impart on the effect of graduate education 
on performance.  Thus, the results in table 11 provide stronger evidence to accept the 
alternative in hypothesis 1 that performance ‘after’ is greater than performance ‘before.’  
Our preliminary analysis within groups shows that performance ‘after’ is statistically and 
practically greater than performance ‘before.’  Proceeding with our hypothesis testing, we 
test hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 through a comparative analysis across groups also 
controlling for rank at O4.   
2. Comparative Analysis 
Tables 12 and 13 show the results of testing hypothesis 2 through a comparative 
analysis of performance between the PME, Non-PME, and NOS officers controlled for 
rank at O4 using the ANOVA F-test procedure.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
Ho :   avgPIafter PME  = avgPIafter Non-PME =  avgPIafterNOS 
HA :  avgPIafter PME  ≠  avgPIafter Non-PME ≠   avgPIafterNOS 
 
ANOVA 
Dependent Variable Control variable F-value Pr>F 
avgPIafter Group (PME, Non-PME, NOS) .08 .924 
 










Ho :   avg∆PIPME  = avg∆PINon-PME =  avg∆PINOS 
HA :  avg∆PIPME  = avg∆PINon-PME =  avg∆PINOS 
 
ANOVA 
Dependent Variable Control variable F-value Pr>F 
avg∆PI Group (PME, Non-PME, NOS) .31 .731 
 
Table 13.   ANOVA Procedure for avg∆PI for O4 
 
The results of the ANOVA F-test using avgPIafter and avg∆PI as criterion 
variables indicate that performance ‘after’ is not statistically different across the groups.  
The resultant p-values are .924 and .731, therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that avgPIafter and avg∆PI across the groups are equal.  We infer that although officer 
performance increases over time for all groups, the increases in performance of each 
group when compared to each other are the same.  Thus, the increases in performance 
due to PME and Non-PME graduate education are likely no different in magnitude than 
the increase in performance that occurs when not attending graduate school.  Since 
avgPIafter and avg∆PI across the groups are not statistically different in testing 
hypothesis 2, the need for testing hypothesis 3 is obviated.    
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The data set used in this study were collected and formulated to support a before 
and after analysis of participation in Marine Corps graduate education on performance.  
The data set includes new fitness reports, demographic, and career information.  The 
observation period used in the study (JAN99-JAN03) includes the time period during 
which use of the new fitness report was used. 
The officers observed are categorized into three groups:  the two treatment groups 
are PME and Non-PME; the comparison group is the no school or NOS group. 
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The testing of three hypotheses is undertaken to determine the effect of Marine 
Corps graduate education on officer performance.  Preliminary analysis of performance 
indices within the groups supports the first hypothesis that performance ‘after’ the 
treatment point is greater than performance ‘before.’  This hypothesis is strengthened 
when analysis reveals the same result when controlling for rank.  At the completion of 
analysis within groups we determine that within the PME, Non-PME, and NOS group 
performance ‘after’ has increased in level (avgPIafter) and the change in performance 
(avg∆PI) is positive.  Preliminary comparative analysis across the groups indicates that 
the changes in performance across all three groups are not statistically different from 
each other when controlled for rank at O4.  Specifically, that the effects of PME graduate 
education and Non-PME graduate education on performance when compared to each 
other are not different and when compared to the alternative effects due to not attending 
graduate school they are also not different. 
Although the preliminary analysis provides some evidence to answer our research 
questions, further analysis is required.  Our preliminary analysis shows that the addition 
of a single non-treatment control variable (rank) in the analysis within groups, produced 
results indicating the effects of graduate education on performance were different than 
when only controlling for group.  
 We accept that our ANOVA results provide a stronger analysis within a particular 
group when rank is controlled at O4; however, rank alone should not be considered the 
only variable that must be controlled in order to isolate the effect of graduate education 
on performance.  Understanding that several other variables may also be important in the 
explanation of performance, we conduct multivariate analysis in chapter VI.  Our 
multivariate analysis further isolates the effects of graduate education on performance 
while holding demographic, affective and cognitive variables constant.  Multivariate 
analysis can provide evidence to infer that Marine Corps graduate education causes 
changes in officer performance. 
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VI. MUTLTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
A. MODELS 
1. Theoretical Relationship and General Model 
The theoretical relationship examined in the multivariate analysis has been 
investigated in several prior studies.  The underlying theoretical relationship is that 
individual job performance is in part a function of education.  In the current case, the 
hypothesis is that Marine officer performance is determined in part by graduate 
education. 
This relationship has been estimated in prior studies by Bowman and Mehay 
(1999), Branigan (2001), and Estridge (1995).  As noted earlier, the authors assert that 
officer performance is a function of demographic, cognitive, and affective traits as in the 
equation below. 
 
Performance =  f (demographic traits, cognitive traits, affective traits) 
 
Our general model uses various performance indexes (PI) as dependent variables 
and participation in Marine Corps graduate education as the focus variable.  The general 
model is stated below where the two performance indexes are shown: 
 
avgPI after  =   f [demographic traits, cognitive traits, affective traits  
(avg∆PI)              graduate education  (PME or Non-PME)] 
                                               
 
The model assumes that the performance indexes, avgPI after and avg∆PI, can be 
explained by characteristics of the officer, including aptitude, career attributes, and 
participation in Marine Corps graduate education.   
The models are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques using 
cross sectional data on Marine officers.   Before discussing the specifications and results 
of the OLS estimations, the variables used in these models are introduced and explained. 
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2. Variable Introduction 
The variables are grouped into five categories; performance indices, demographic 
traits, cognitive traits, affective traits, and treatment variables. Table 14 lists and 
describes the variables used in the multivariate analysis.  Table 15 shows the frequency 





Performance Indices:  
AvgPIafter Continuous, = average PI after graduate PME 
or Non-PME graduate education 
avg∆PI Continuous, = average PI after graduate PME 
or Non-PME graduate education 
 
Demographic Traits:  
Non-white = 1 if black, Hispanic, Asian, and other; = 0 if 
Caucasian 
Female = 1 if female; = 0 if male; 
Married = 1 if married; =0 if single or divorced 
Depns Continuous, = number of dependents 
 
Cognitive Traits:  
GCT_top =1 if GCT score is in top third based on 
distribution of scores in sample; = 0 if not in 
top third 
GCT_mid =1 if GCT score is in middle third based on 
distribution of scores in sample; = 0 if not in 
middle third 
GCT_bottom =1 if GCT score is in bottom third based on 
distribution of scores in sample; = 0 if not in 
bottom third 
Top_TBS =1 if TBS class rank is in top third of 
respective class; = 0 if not in top third 
Mid_TBS =1 if TBS class rank is in middle third of 
respective class; = 0 if not in middle third 
Low_TBS =1 if TBS class rank is in bottom third of 
respective class; = 0 if not in bottom third 
 
Affective Traits:  
            OCS =1 if accession source is OCC, PLC, MECEP, 
or ECP; = 0 if not 
Svc_acad =1 if accession source is a Service Academy;  
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= 0 if not 
ROTC = 1 if accession source is ROTC; = 0 if not 
Prior =1 if having at least 4yrs prior enlisted service; 
= 0 if not 
Combat = 1 if MOS is 03XX, 08XX, or 18XX; = 0 if 
not 
Aviation = 1 if MOS is 75XX; = 0 if not 
Non-combat = 0 if MOS is 03XX, 08XX, 18XX, or 75XX; 
= 1 if not; all other MOS variable 
  
Treatment Variables:  
PME = 1 if graduated from PME graduate school;  
= 0 if not; 
Non_PME = 1 if graduated from Non-PME graduate 
school;  = 0 if not; 
NOS = 1 if attended neither PME or Non-PME 
graduate school; = 0 if attended either PME or 
Non-PME graduate school 
 
Table 14.   Variable Name and Description 
 
 
Size of Sample (N = 994) Frequency Percent (%) 
   
Demographic Variables:   
White 887 89.24 
Non-white  107 10.76 
Female 28 2.82 
Married 463 46.58 
Unmarried  531 53.42 
Depns = 0 266 26.79 
Depns = 1 249 25.08 
Depns =  2 145 14.60 
Depns = 3 198 19.94 
Depns = 4 98 9.87 
Depns = 5 31 3.12 
Depns = 6 4 .40 
Depns = 7 1 .10 
Depns = 8 1 .10 
 
Affective Variables:   
OCS  653 65.69 
Svc_Acad  117 11.77 
ROTC 222 22.23 
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Prior  103 10.36 
Combat  274 27.57 
Non-combat  415 42.75 
Aviation  305 30.68 
 
Cognitive Variables:   
GCT_top 231 23.24 
GCT_mid  381 38.33 
GCT_bottom  382 38.43 
Top_TBS  438 44.06 
Mid_TBS  318 31.99 
Low_TBS  236 23.74 
 
Table 15.   Frequency of Variables 
 
3. Performance Indices 
AvgPIafter and avg∆PI are the dependent variables in the multivariate models.  
Both Estridge (1995) and Branigan (2001) used performance indicators in their research.  
Although the selected performance index was used as an explanatory variable to predict 
promotion to O4 and O5, rather than as a dependent variable, their findings validate the 
use of variables based on fitness reports. Both authors find that their performance index 
variable is a significant and positive predictor of promotion.    We assert that not only are 
performance index-based variables accurate predictors of future officer performance, but 
also provide accurate measures of current officer performance. 
4. Demographic Traits 
The prior studies cited in the literature review found that race, gender, marital 
status, and dependent status should be included in research examining military 
performance.  As within any organization, social norms and potential biases based on 
demographics may be operative in the assessment of performance in the Marine Corps.  
Non-white is a binary variable that represents minority race and ethnicity.   Despite 
contemporary emphasis on determining the impact of race on promotion, performance, 
and retention, most empirical research shows that race is not a significant predictor of 
these outcomes.  Bowman and Mehay (1999), Branigan (2001), and Estridge (1995) 
show that race is statistically insignificant in explaining probability of promotion and 
retention in the military.   Despite these findings, we expect that being nonwhite 
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(nonwhite = 1) will have a significant and negative impact on avgPIafter and avg∆PI, 
compared with being white (nonwhite = 0).  
Female is a binary variable that indicates the gender of the officer.  One 
hypothesis is that the culture of the Marine Corps imparts institutional bias against 
women.  If so, this bias against women would likely emerge during fitness report 
reviews.  Therefore, we hypothesize that an officer who is a female (female = 1) will 
have a lower avgPIafter and avg∆PI than a male officer (female = 0), all else equal. 
Married and Dependent are variables that represent marital and dependent status.  
Married is a binary variable = 1 for those who are married, and = 0 otherwise. Dependent 
is a continuous variable. Labor economic theory asserts that employees who are married 
and/or who have children accumulate more job specific human capital and thus are more 
productive.  Bowman and Mehay (2002) found that married officers received better 
fitness reports and were more likely to be promoted to the rank of O4 in the Navy, than 
single officers.  Branigan (2001) reveals that marital status, and number of dependents 
are not statistically significant in predicting the probability of retention to 16YCS or 
promotion to O5 for Marine Corps officers.  We hypothesize that being married (married 
= 1) and the number of dependents will have a positive effect on avgPIafter and  
avg∆PI.   
Table 16 depicts the frequency of demographic variables within each treatment 
group.  Minority representation in the Non-PME group is 15.7% greater than in the PME 
and NOS groups (10.7% and 9.4%, respectively).  Females are equally represented in 
each treatment group. The PME group has a higher percentage of married individuals 
than the Non-PME and NOS group.  The PME group also has the highest percentage of 










 PME Non-PME NOS 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Non-white = 1 39 10.7 21 15.7 47 9.46 
Non-white = 0 325 89.3 112 84.21 450 90.54 
Female = 1 11 3.02 4 3.01 13 2.62 
Female = 0 353 97.0 129 97.0 484 97.38 
Married = 1 334 91.8 31 23.3 98 19.7 
Married = 0 30 8.24 102 76.7 399 80.3 
Depns = 0 24 6.59 37 27.8 205 41.25 
Depn = 1 or more 340 93.4 96 27.8 292 58.8 
 
Table 16.   Frequency of Demographic Variables Within Groups 
 
5. Cognitive Traits 
GCT variables (GCT_top, GCT_mid, GCT_bottom) represent the officer’s scores 
on the Armed Forces General Classification Test.   The GCT is the Marine Corp’s 
traditional entrance level aptitude test used to categorize Marines with respect to mental 
ability.  The GCT tests mathematical, reading, and mechanical ability.  Interestingly, 
despite the long-standing dependence of the Marine Corps and other services on the 
GCT, Estridge (1995), Branigan (2001), Roush (1972) and Lloyd (1977) show that it is 
not a statistically significant predictor of performance.  For example, Estridge (1995) 
finds that officers with higher GCT scores were more likely to be promoted to O4 and 
O5, but the correlation was statistically insignificant.  Likewise, Branigan’s (2001) 
research reveals that GCT was insignificant in explaining promotion and retention 
probabilities.  Finally, in Roush’s (1972) and Lloyd’s (1977) doctoral dissertations 
examining the impact of attending SEP and AWS on subsequent military fitness report 
marks, the marginal effect of GCT scores was also insignificant. 
It is hypothesized that officers with higher GCT scores will have higher 
avgPIafter and avg∆PI.  Despite the findings of prior studies GCT purports to assess 
mental aptitude and therefore should be significant factor in explaining performance. 
TBS variables (top_TBS, mid_TBS, and low_TBS) indicate class standing upon 
graduation from the The Basic School.  Class standing is determined by officer 
performance in academic, leadership, and military courses.  The convention of dividing 
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TBS ranks into thirds is used by the Marine Corps for officer classification, most notably 
during initial MOS assignment upon completion of TBS. 
Prior studies find that performance at TBS is a strong predictor of subsequent 
officer performance.  Branigan (2001) showed that TBS grade point average (GPA), a 
proxy for performance comparable to TBS class rank, was statistically significant when 
analyzing promotion probabilities and the likelihood of completing graduate education.  
He reveals that officers who have higher TBS GPA’s are more likely to be promoted to 
O5 and attain graduate degrees.  We hypothesize that the relationship between TBS class 
rank (top_TBS, mid_TBS, and low_TBS) and performance (avgPIafter and avg∆PI) will 
be positive. 
Table 17 depicts the frequency of the cognitive variables within groups.  The 
Non-PME group has the highest percentage of officers who score in the top third of GCT 
scores in the sample; the NOS group has the lowest percentage.  The PME group has the 
highest percentage of officers who graduated from TBS in the top third of their class.  
The NOS group has the lowest percentage of officers who graduated in the top third of 
their TBS class. 
 
Variable Group 
 PME Non_PME NOS 
 Number percent number percent number percent 
GCT_top = 1 82 22.5 41 30.8 108 21.7 
GCT_mid = 1 125 34.3 52 39.1 204 41.0 
GCT_bottom=1 157 43.1 40 30.1 185 37.2 
Top_TBS = 1 181 50.0 55 41.4 202 40.6 
mid_TBS = 1 114 31.5 44 33.1 160 32.2 
low_TBS = 1 67 18.5 34 25.5 135 27.2 
Note:  less than .1 percent of observations have missing values for these variables 
Table 17.   Frequency of Cognitive Variables By Group 
 
6. Affective Traits  
OCS, Svc_Acad, and ROTC are variables that describe officer accession source.  
OCS is a binary variable = 1 if the officer was commissioned through the Officer 
Candidate Course (OCC), Platoon Leaders Course (PLC), Enlisted Commissioning 
Program (ECP) or the Marine Enlisted Commissioning and Education Program 
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(MECEP).  Svc_Acad indicates if an officer was commissioned through the United States 
Naval Academy, the United States Military Academy, or the United States Air Force 
Academy.  ROTC = 1 if the officer is commissioned through the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps.  Prior studies show that the varying levels of military acculturation of 
graduates from the seven different officer accession sources affect level of performance.  
It is expected that programs that impart higher degrees of military acculturation produce 
higher performing officers.  For example, Bowman and Mehay (1999) find that officers 
from USNA are more likely to attain graduate degrees.  Estridge (1995) shows that 
USNA graduates are more likely to be promoted to O4 than their cohorts from other 
accession sources.  We hypothesize that being commissioned through service academies 
(Svc_acad = 1) and ROTC (ROTC = 1) will have positive marginal effects on avgPIafter 
and avg∆PI compared with commissioning through OCC, PLC, ECP, and MECEP 
(OCS=1).   
Prior represents the attainment of four years of prior enlisted service before 
commissioning.  Officers who serve at least four years enlisted service are designated 
O1E’s upon commissioning.  Branigan (2001) finds that prior enlisted experience as 
defined by the O1E designation is statistically insignificant in explaining retention and 
promotion to O5.  However, the author notes that his finding may be affected by the fact 
that prior to promotion to O5 many O1E’s reach 20YCS and separate from active service.  
It is believed that prior enlisted experience gives O1E’s a performance advantage over 
their non-prior service counterparts throughout their careers.  We hypothesize that having 
prior enlisted service (Prior = 1) will positively affect avgPIafter and avg∆PI. 
Combat, Non-combat, and Aviation are binary variables that represent three 
categories of officer MOS’s.  The grouping of MOS’s into the three respective categories 
was based on traditional convention and skill requirements.  Culturally MOS’s are 
believed to be of two types, combat and non-combat (with aviation being a subset of 
combat).  Combat MOS’s are culturally accepted as the most critical with respect to 
accomplishing the mission of the Marine Corps.  Non-combat MOS’s are subordinate in 
this regard.  Aviation is a separate category in that the skills required for these MOS’s 
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differ from other MOS’s.  We believe that MOS grouping is significant in explaining 
performance but the direction of the effect is hard to sign. 
Table 18 summarizes the frequencies of affective variables by group.  The highest 
percentage of officers in all groups accessed through OCS.  The Non-PME group has the 
highest percentage of officers who were commissioned through the Service Academies.  
There are relatively equal percentages of ROTC officers that participated in PME and 
Non-PME graduate education.  Interestingly, the Non-PME group has the highest 
percentage of prior enlisted officers.  Twice as many Non-PME officers are prior enlisted 
compared to PME officers.  PME and Non-PME officers have the highest percentage of 
non-combat MOS’s.  NOS officers have the highest percentage of aviation MOS’s. 
 
Variable Group 
 PME Non_PME NOS 
 number percent number percent number percent 
OCS = 1 229 63.0 71 53.4 353 71.0 
Svc_acad = 1 43 11.8 28 21.1 46 9.3 
ROTC = 1 90 24.7 34 25.6 98 19.7 
Prior = 1 29 8.0 22 16.5 52 10.5 
Combat = 1 132 36.3 1 .75 141 28.4 
Aviation = 1 90 24.7 30 22.6 185 37.2 
Non_Combat = 1 142 39.0 102 76.7 171 34.4 
 
Table 18.   Frequency of Affective Variables By Group 
 
7. Treatment Variables 
The relationships between the variables PME and Non_PME and the performance 
indices avgPIafter and avg∆PI are the primary focus of the multivariate analysis.  Our 
hypothesized relationship between the treatment variables and the performance indices 
has been stated and analyzed in previous chapters.  We hypothesize that the marginal 
effects of PME (PME = 1) and Non_PME (Non_PME = 1) on avgPIafter and avg∆PI will 
be positive.  Additionally, we hypothesize that Non_PME avgPIafter and avg∆PI will be 
relatively more important in explaining than PME. 
Previous studies show mixed results on the effect of graduate education (PME and 
Non-PME) on performance.  Bowman and Mehay (1999) find that after eliminating the 
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effects of selection bias, graduate education had a positive impact on the promotion of 
Navy officers to O4.  Branigan (2001) finds that officers with traditional graduate degrees 
(Non-PME) are more likely to be promoted to O5.  On the other hand, Roush (1972) and 
Lloyd (1977) find that subsequent military performance markings after attending SEP 
and AWS are no better than before attending the respective programs. This lack of 
consistency in the results of prior studies, and the results of the preliminary analysis 
suggests further testing of the effect of the variables PME and Non-PME on avgPIafter 
and avg∆PI is warranted.  The following section discusses the specific multivariate 
models tested in our analysis.  The interpretations of the results are also included.  
B. SPECIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
The purpose of estimating Models 1 and 2 is to determine the effect of Non-PME 
graduate education on officer performance. Models 1 and 2 are estimated by OLS 
procedures.  Models 1 and 2 are specified below. 
Model 1 (sample = O3, O4, O5):  avgPIafter =  Non_PME - nonwhite - female + married 
+ combat 
Model 2 (sample = O3, O4, O5):  avg∆PI =  Non_PME  -  nonwhite  -  female – married 
+ combat 
The explanatory variables included in both Models are Non_PME, the binary variables 
that indicates attendance at Non-PME graduate school and those demographic and 
affective variables that were hypothesized to significantly affect officer performance.  
The dependent variables represent performance after the treatment point, and the change 
in performance from ‘before’ to ‘after.’ 
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The base case for Models 1 and 2 is a no school officer (NOS) who is a single 
white male, with the rank of O4 and has a non-combat MOS.  The NOS group is 
represented in the models when Non_PME = 0. Officers in the PME group are excluded 
from the sample for these model estimations.   The purpose of using Non-PME and NOS 
only is to establish the marginal effect of attending Non-PME graduate school on 
performance as compared to attending no advanced education, all else equal.   This is the 
approach adopted in most prior studies and will facilitate comparison.  In both models 
including only O3, O4, and O5 in the sample controls for rank. Estimating models 1 and 
2 provide a baseline program evaluation for Non-PME graduate education.   
The results are summarized in Table 19.  In Model 1 the dependent variable is 
avgPIafter.   The intercept is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or 
greater.  The intercept equals the avgPIafter of a base case officer.  It states that a base 
case officer will have an average PI of 4.66 after the treatment point.    The mean ‘after’ 
performance (avgPIafter) in the sample is 4.59.  The coefficient for Non_PME is positive, 
but not statistically significant at any normally tested level.   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Dependent Variable = avgPI 
after 
Dependent Variable = avg∆PI 
 Coeff (β) p-value Coeff (β) p-value 
Intercept 4.65680** .0001 0.38226** .0001 
Treatment variable    
Non_PME 0.04633 0.4714 -0.16571** 0.0469 
Demographic variables    
Nonwhite -0.22487** 0.0077 -0.26915** 0.0136 
Female 0.23203 0.1588 0.11854 0.5777 
Married 0.08008 0.2065 -0.04153 0.6125 
Cognitive variables    
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
Affective variables    
O3 -0.52671** 0.0001 0.09976 0.1402 
O5 0.46736** 0.0014 0.09921 0.5985 
Combat .17787** 0.0050 -0.03838 0.6388 
     
 N = 609  N = 609  
 F-stat =22.40** .0001 F-stat =1.88* .0706 
 R-square 0.2069  R-square  .0214  
**Significant at the .05 level 
*Significant at the .10 level 
 
Table 19.   Baseline Program Evaluation Models (Non-PME) 
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This indicates that the marginal effect of Non_PME is not statistically different from 
zero.  Attending Non-PME graduate education results in ‘after’ performance that is no 
different from the mean ‘after’ performance of an NOS officer.  Thus, we can infer that 
the subsequent performance of an officer who attends Non-PME graduate education is 
likely no different than that of an officer who does not attend.  The other significant 
explanatory variables were nonwhite, combat, and O5. Their signs are as hypothesized.  
The F-stat (22.4**) shows that as a group the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant in explaining average performance after the treatment period.   
Avg∆PI is used as the dependent variable in model 2.  Aside from not using 
avgPIafter on the left hand side, the specification of model 2 is identical to model 1.  The 
intercept is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or greater.  The 
intercept equals the avg∆PI of a base case officer.  It shows that the base case officer, one 
who does not attend Non-PME graduate education, will have a positive change (increase) 
in average performance of .382.  The mean change in performance (avg∆PI) of the 
sample is .408.  The coefficient for Non_PME is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level.  The coefficient indicates that the performance of an officer who 
attends Non-PME graduate education will be lower than a NOS officer by .166, which is 
40.7 percent lower.  The other significant explanatory variable is nonwhite.  The F-stat 
(1.88) for the overall model is much lower in model 2 and is significant at only the .07 
level. 
Combining the results of models 1 and 2 allows us to make inferences about the 
effect of Non-PME graduate education on performance.  The models show that attending 
traditional graduate education results in subsequent performance that cannot be shown to 
be greater than the performance of an NOS officer.  The estimation also reveals that the 
change in performance experienced by not attending Non-PME graduate education (i.e., 
“remaining in the fleet”) is greater than attending (i.e., “leaving the fleet.”) 
The purpose of models 3 and 4 is to provide the same baseline program evaluation 
for PME graduate education as was conducted for Non-PME graduate education in 
models 1 and 2.   PME graduate education is compared to the NOS group only.  The base 
case for models 3 and 4 is a no school officer (NOS) who is a single white male, with the 
rank of O4 and has a non-combat MOS. 
Model 3 (sample = O3, O4, O5):  avgPIafter  =  PME -  nonwhite - female + married + 
combat  
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Model 4 (sample = O3, O4, O5):  avg∆PI  =  PME  -  nonwhite  -  female  -  married  +  
combat 
The results are summarized in Table 20.  In model 3 the dependent variable is 
avgPIafter.   The intercept is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
The intercept equals the avgPIafter of a base case officer.  It states that a base case 
officer, one who does not attend PME graduate education, will have an average PI of 4.69 
after the treatment point.  The mean ‘after’ performance in the sample is 4.59.   The 
coefficient for PME is negative, but not statistically significant. 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Dependent Variable = avgPI 
after 
Dependent Variable = avg∆PI 
 Coeff (β) p-value Coeff (β) p-value 
Intercept 4.69561 ** .0001 0.30001** .0001 
Treatment variable    
PME -0.05578  0.4428 0.06382 0.5428 
Demographic variables    
Nonwhite -0.21525 ** 0.0026 -0.23891** 0.0204 
Female 0.13198 0.3194 0.09057 0.6357 
Married 0.06533 0.2852 -0.00881 0.9204 
Cognitive variables    
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- 
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
Affective variables    
Combat 0.10831 ** 0.0175 -0.02238 0.7331 
O3 -0.54190 ** .0001 0.21264** 0.0082 
O5 0.31808** .0001 0.29422** 0.0006 
     
 N = 832  N = 832  
 F-stat =38.54 ** .0001 F-stat =3.49** .0011 
 R-square .2466  R-square 0.0288  
**Significant at the .05 level 
*Significant at the .10 level 
 
Table 20.   Baseline Program Evaluation Models (PME) 
 
This indicates that attending PME graduate education results in ‘after’ performance that 
is no different from the mean ‘after’ performance of a NOS officer.  Thus, we can infer 
that the subsequent performance of an officer who attends PME graduate education is 
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likely not significantly different from that of an officer who does not attend.  The other 
significant explanatory variables are nonwhite, O3 and combat.  Their signs are as 
hypothesized.  The F-stat (38.5**) shows that as a group the explanatory variables as 
specified are statistically significant in explaining average performance after the 
treatment period.   
Avg∆PI is used as the dependent variable in Model 4.  The intercept is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The intercept equals the avg∆PI of a 
base case officer.  It shows that a base case officer, one who does not attend PME 
graduate education, will have an increase in average performance of .300.  The average 
change in performance in the sample is .408.  The coefficient for PME is statistically 
insignificant.  Thus, we can infer that the change in performance of an officer who 
attends PME graduate education is not significantly different from than that of an officer 
who does not attend.  The other significant explanatory variables are nonwhite, O3 and 
O5.  Their signs are as hypothesized.  The F-stat (3.49**) indicates that the independent 
variables jointly are significant. 
The estimation of Models 3 and 4 show that attending PME graduate education 
does not result in subsequent performance any different from not having attended.  The 
estimations also reveal that the change in performance experienced by attending PME 
graduate education is not significantly different from not attending. Thus, the effects of 
attending PME graduate education results in performance that is equal to not having 
attended any graduate education.   
The purpose of Models 5 and 6 is to provide a comparative analysis of the effects 
of PME and Non-PME graduate education on officer performance.  In order to control for 
selection bias we include the full range of demographic, affective and cognitive traits.  
Cognitive variables are particularly important in controlling for selections bias.  Because 
selection boards for PME and Non-PME graduate education programs use GCT score 
(GCT_top, GCT_mid) and TBS class rank (top_TBS, mid_TBS) to select officers for 
attendance, including these variables controls for cognitive skills.  Therefore, the biases 
that the differences in innate cognitive ability impart on the estimated effects of graduate 
education on performance should be lessened.  Models 5 and 6 provide the most reliable 
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analysis of how graduate education, PME or Non-PME, affects performance compared to 
each other and compared to no graduate education.   In Models 5 and 6 we also 
reexamine the specification of the explanatory variables in an attempt to improve 
predictability (R-square).  Models 1 through 4 included only the demographic and 
affective traits hypothesized to have the greatest predictive effect on officer performance.  
The highest resultant R-squares were .246 for models using avgPIafter as the dependent 
variable, and .028 for models using avg∆PI.     
The specifications of Models 5 and 6 are as follows: 
Model 5 (sample = O3, O4, and O5):  avgPIafter =  PME + Non_PME - nonwhite - 
female + married + depns + top_tbs + mid_tbs + gct_top + gct_mid + ROTC + svc_acad 
- prior + combat + aviation  - O3 + O5 
Model 6 (sample = O3, O4, and O5):  avg∆PI  =  PME + Non_PME - nonwhite - female 
+ married + depns + top_tbs + mid_tbs + gct_top + gct_mid + ROTC + svc_acad - prior 
+ combat + aviation  - O3 + O5 
The base case officer for Models 5 and 6 is a no school (NOS) single white male, with no 
dependents, in the bottom third of GCT score, who graduated in the bottom third of TBS 
class, who was commissioned through OCS, is a Major (O4) and has a non-combat MOS.  
The data used in estimating the models were restricted to the ranks of O3, O4 and O5 and 
included all three groups (PME, Non-PME and NOS).  The results of the estimation are 


















 Model 5 Model 6 
 Dependent Variable = avgPI 
after 
Dependent Variable = avg∆PI 
 Coeff (β) p-value Coeff (β) p-value 
Intercept 4.70819** .0001 0.40381** .0001 
Treatment variables    
PME -0.07865 0.2750 0.00112 0.9915 
Non_PME -0.05738 0.3710 -0.17786* 0.0588 
Demographic variables    
Nonwhite -0.19042** 0.0045 -0.24835** 0.0114 
Female 0.03519 0.7771 0.02541 0.8891 
Married 0.05046 0.4442 -0.03976 0.6808 
Depns 0.01364 0.4719 0.02506 0.3674 
Cognitive variables    
Top_TBS 0.23160** .0001 0.04527 0.5644 
mid_TBS 0.09287** 0.0905 -0.04214 0.6001 
GCT_top -0.07861 0.1769 -0.02781 0.7444 
GCT_mid -0.05494 0.2496 -0.05227 0.4548 
Affective variables    
ROTC 0.06197 0.2283 -0.02936 0.6969 
Svc_acad 0.11686* 0.0793 0.14140 0.1474 
Prior -0.24457** 0.0007 -.29407** 0.0071 
O3 -0.48656** .0001 0.13549* 0.0685 
O5 0.28913** .0001 -17686** 0.0041 
Combat -0.03720 0.4733 -0.06460 0.3957 
Aviation -0.25465** .0001 -0.05681 0.4416 
     
 N= 964  N= 964  
 F-stat = 20.80** .0001 F-stat = 2.42** 0.001 
 R-square =.2721  R-square= 0.0417  
**Significant at the .05 level 
*Significant at the .10 level 
 
Table 21.   Comparative Model 
 
The results of Model 5 in Table 21 show that an officer who does not attend either 
PME or Non-PME graduate education will have ‘after’ performance of 4.71. The mean 
after performance in the sample is 4.59.  The marginal effect of Non_PME on avgPIafter 
is not statistically different from zero indicating that attending Non-PME graduate 
education results in ‘after’ performance that is the same as that of an officer who does not 
attend.  The marginal effect of PME is also not statistically different from zero, indicating 
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that attending PME graduate education results in ‘after’ performance no different from 
that of an officer who does not attend.  The other significant explanatory variables are 
nonwhite, top_TBS, mid_TBS, svc_acad, prior, O3, O5 and aviation.  Their signs are as 
hypothesized.  The overall F-stat (20.80**) is significant at the .01 level and shows that 
the explanatory variables jointly are statistically significant in explaining average 
performance after the treatment period.  Model 5 produced an R-square of .272, which is 
higher than the R-square in Model 3 (.246).  Given our results in Model 5, which controls 
for selection bias and has the best fit of explanatory variables in predicting avgPIafter, we 
conclude that the effects that PME and Non-PME graduate education have on 
performance ‘after’ are the same.   
The explanatory variables in Model 6 are the same as in Model 5.  The dependent 
variable is avg∆PI.  The intercept is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  The intercept equals the avg∆PI of a base case officer.  It shows that an officer 
who does not attend either PME or Non-PME graduate education will have a higher 
increase in average performance (.404).   The mean change in performance (avg∆PI) in 
the sample is .408.   The mean change in performance for a Non-PME officer in the 
sample is .230.  The Non_PME coefficient indicates that an officer who attends Non-
PME graduate education will have a change in performance that is 43.6 percent less than 
the mean change in performance in the sample.  The other significant explanatory 
variables were nonwhite, prior, O3 and O5.  The overall F-stat (2.42**) indicates that the 
independent variables jointly are significant.  Model 6 produced an R-square of .0417, 
which is higher than the R-square in Model 4 (.0288).  Given our results in Model 6, 
which controls for selection bias and has the best fit of explanatory variables in predicting 
avg∆PI, we conclude that the effects that PME and Non-PME graduate education have on 
the change in performance are not the same.  PME graduate education has no significant 
effect on the change in performance, while Non-PME graduate is associated with a 
slightly significant (.10 level) drop in performance.  
In order to determine if the inclusion of the full range of demographic, affective, 
and cognitive variables were effective in controlling for selection bias, two comparative 
models predicting avgPIafter and avg∆PI were estimated that included both treatment 
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variables PME and Non_PME, but excluded the cognitive variables.  The results of these 
models can be found in Appendix B.  A comparison of the differences in the PME and 
Non_PME coefficients between Model 5 and Model 6 to the models in Appendix B 
should reveal if selection bias was present.  The comparisons revealed that not including 
cognitive variables in models predicting the effect of graduate education on performance 
(whether ‘after’ treatment or the change in performance is used) overstates the effects of 
graduate education.  This suggests that the specification of Models 5 and 6 was 
successful in controlling for selection bias. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Six multivariate models were analyzed to determine the marginal effect of Marine 
Corps graduate education on officer performance when controlling for the effects of 
demographic, affective and cognitive traits.  Models 1 through 6 were estimated using 
OLS procedures and segmented pooled cross-sectional data.    Table 22 summarizes the 
resultant relationships between the dependent variables (avgPIafter, avg∆PI) and the 
explanatory variables of interest (PME and Non_PME) in models 1 through 6. 















1 avgPIafter    + + .04633 
2 avg∆PI    + - .16571** 
3 avgPIafter + - .07265    
4 avg∆PI + + .10482    
5 avgPIafter + - .70201 + + .05378 
6 avg∆PI + + .00112 + - .17786* 
**Significant at the .05 level          *Significant at the .10 level 
 
Table 22.   Summary of Results of Multivariate Analysis 
 
Models 1 through 4 served as a baseline program evaluation of Non-PME and 
PME graduate education.  The estimations showed that Non-PME graduate education 
results in performance after the treatment point that is not significantly different from not 
having attended graduate education.  The estimations showed that PME graduate 
education results in performance, using both indicators, that is not significantly greater 
than not having attended graduate education.  Models 5 and 6 provide a comparative 
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analysis of the different effects that Non-PME and PME advanced education impart on 
officer performance.  The estimations answer our primary research question.  Model 5 
shows that when compared to each other, the effects of PME and Non-PME graduate 
education on ‘after’ performance are no different.  Model 6 shows that the effect of Non-
PME graduate education on the change in performance is negative (significant at .10 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the preliminary analysis in Chapter V on the performance indexes 
avgPIafter and avg∆PI establish that Marine officer performance on fitreps increases 
naturally over time for each of the observed groups (PME, Non-PME, and NOS).  As 
described in Chapter III, the PME group includes Marine officers who attended the 
resident Command and Staff course, the School of Advanced Warfighting or Marine 
Corps War College, whereas Non-PME includes Marine officers who attended SEP, ADP 
or LEP, and NOS includes Marine officers who attended neither.  The ANOVA in 
Chapter V found no statistical difference between avgPIafter and avg∆PI for the three 
groups.  Therefore, our initial conclusion was that attending either PME or Non-PME 
graduate education may increase officer performance but does not significantly alter it 
compared to an officer who attends neither.  The ANOVA results support the argument 
that officer performance improves over time; however, the factors that affect that 
improvement may include fleet experience, demographics, or variables other than 
graduate education.  Of those variables, the only one that was held constant across all 
groups was rank at O4.  We cannot conclude that at the rank of O4 the benefit of PME or 
Non-PME graduate education results in improved performance at least as measured using 
fitness report scores.      
Chapter VI isolates the effects of graduate education on officer performance by 
controlling for variables other than graduate education through multivariate analysis.  The 
results of the multivariate analysis provide further support for the findings in Chapter V.  
The marginal effect of PME and Non-PME graduate education on an officer’s 
performance ‘after’ (avgPIafter) is not statistically different from that of an officer who 
attends neither, when holding affective, cognitive and demographic variables constant.  In 
the case of change in performance (avg∆PI) our multivariate analysis shows that the 
effect of Non-PME graduate education on performance is significantly smaller than no 
graduate education.  The coefficient of the Non_PME variable is -.177 and statistically 
significant above the .05 percent level when holding affective, cognitive and 
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demographic variables constant.  The coefficient for PME is not statistically significant.  
From these results, shown above in Table 21 we conclude that the change in performance 
from ‘before’ to ‘after’ PME graduate education is not significantly different from not 
attending graduate school.  We may also conclude that the effect of Non-PME graduate 
education on change in performance (avg∆PI) is smaller than either no school or PME. 
Based on the results of our preliminary analysis and the multivariate analysis we 
conclude that, for the operative ranks represented in our sample (O3, O4, and O5), 
graduate education regardless of type does not significantly improve performance 
compared to not attending graduate education at all.  Our findings also support the 
conclusion that with respect to change in performance over time, Non-PME graduate 
education results in a smaller increase when compared to either no school or PME 
graduate school.  Our conclusions may only apply to the ranks of O3 through O5 and 
performance immediately following the attainment of a graduate education.  The results 
of our preliminary and multivariate analysis do not predict the potential long term effects 
of PME or Non-PME graduate education at career points where officers achieve ranks of 
O6 and above and serve in senior level staff positions. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
It is likely that the long-term effects of both PME and Non-PME graduate 
education on officer performance are not realized immediately but only later in an 
officer’s career when rank and job assignments require greater analytical and decision-
making ability.  Through the rank of O3 and O4, Marine Corps tactics and war fighting 
skills are more important than strategic planning and analytical decision-making skills.  
At the senior ranks O6 and above cognitive skills, which are more likely to be enhanced 
by graduate level education, become more important.   
Polachek and Siebert (1993) establish that leaving one’s occupational specialty or 
the workforce may lead to lower performance immediately upon returning to the 
workforce.  For example, women who take maternity leave generally have lower 
performance immediately upon returning.  In the military, the time spent away from the 
operational (combat) force for the purpose of training or additional schooling is similar to 
leaving the workforce, as the Marine is not working in his primary MOS or specialty.  
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We can compare the effects of leaving the operational force to the effects of leaving the 
workforce in the civilian labor market. 
  Polachek and Siebert (1993) show that performance after reentry into the 
workforce may return to the original trend path, as if the worker had never left.  When 
leaving the work force is for the purpose of additional school or training, performance is 
expected to increase above the original trend in performance.  However, initially 
performance may be below the original trend.  We can apply the same principle to 
Marine Corps graduate education and hypothesize that the true benefit of graduate 
education is not immediately realized but only increases an officer’s performance above 
the original trend over time.  That is, after completion of education, and the return to 
one’s occupational specialty, measured performance will be below the trend line of one 
who remained in the occupation, but will catch up over time.   
The sample size and period of observation of our data limits our ability to 
effectively assess the effects of graduate education beyond the billet assignment 
immediately following PME or Non-PME graduate education.  Because the strength of 
this study lies in the accuracy of the new fitness report adopted in 1999, the data are 
constrained to a four-year period.  Further, to construct ‘before’ and ‘after’ performance 
indexes the data required that graduate education be attained during the four-year period 
of January 1999 to January 2003.  Because these programs are only available to officers 
at particular ranks the distribution of rank for each observed group was constrained to O3 
through O5.  This prevented our study from predicting the effects of graduate education 
on officer performance beyond the first two fitness reports of a utilization tour as shown 




























Figure 6.   Hypothesized Long-Term Effect of PME and Non-PME Graduate 
Education 
 
Because the data are limited to an average of two fitness reports after the 
treatment of graduate education, we conclude that our indicator of post-education 
performance has captured performance of Non-PME graduates before the point where 
increased performance growth kicks-in, represented by vertical line A in Figure 6.  Our 
analysis of performance ‘after’ is constrained to the Non-PME, PME and NOS lines to 
the left of line A in Figure 6.  The limitations of the data prevent our analysis from 
determining if the long-term effects of graduate education follow the same pattern of 
performance as in the civilian labor market described in (Polachek and Siebert, 1993), 
represented by the Non-PME, PME and NOS lines to the right of line A in Figure 6.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study provides a framework for using the new fitness report, adopted in 
1999, to assess graduate education programs.  The strength of this study is the 
methodology of analysis, which reduces the effects of variables unrelated to the effects of 
education on performance.  The use of the fitness report as the performance measure 
rather than a proxy for performance such as promotion or retention minimizes effects of 
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variables that are crucial to both but may not be germane to performance such as MOS 
shortages. 
Additionally, our construction of a performance index (PI) that includes only 
those fitness report traits that can reasonably be assumed to be affected by education can 
be used to more accurately assess the performance effect of other Marine Corps 
education programs.  Hence, we recommend that the methodology developed here be 
continued at the appropriate divisions such as Studies and Analysis Division, Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command or the Integration and Analysis Division, 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs in an effort to more accurately determine the performance 
effects of graduate education beyond initial utilization tours.   
Central to the utility of our methodology is the availability of an appropriate data 
sample that is representative of all ranks that may potentially benefit from an education 
program over time.  Hence our recommendation is that performance data using the new 
fitness report continue to be collected at the aforementioned divisions to provide the 
necessary data for future studies on this topic.  Continuing data collections will allow the 
most accurate assessment of the benefits of graduate education PME, and Non-PME.   
We recommend that policy makers consider the potential long-term benefits of 
graduate education when establishing the career requirements of Marine officers.  There 
may be a benefit to identifying graduate education as a necessary career milestone similar 
to attendance at TBS or the attainment of MOS credibility, rather than treating it merely 
as an optional educational opportunity.  Additionally, the educational opportunity and 
self-improvement offered by attending Non-PME programs should be further 
investigated for their value with respect to retention and career satisfaction as well as for 
the expected performance increase.   
The suggested analyses could lead to credible and equitable policies that apply the 
same career incentive to Non-PME as exists for PME graduate education.  Career 
incentives such as specific language in the Promotion precepts or the addition of a graded 
trait for advanced/graduate education on the fitness report may reduce or alleviate the 
cultural perception that attending Non-PME graduate education is a “career killer.”  
Ultimately, analysis founded on more extensive data could support such policy 
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modifications, which would create a culture where Marine officers who attend PME or 
Non-PME graduate education may benefit equally.  The individual officer would benefit 
from the opportunity to attain advanced education without the fear of negatively 
impacting his career and the Marine Corps would benefit from the retention of officers 
who may otherwise leave the service in pursuit of educational opportunities. 
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APPENDIX B. OMITTED COMPARATIVE MODELS 
 Model A Model B 
 Dependent Variable = avgPI 
after 
Dependent Variable = avg∆PI 
 Coeff (β) p-value Coeff (β) p-value 
Intercept 4.69347** .0001 0.36998** .0001 
Treatment variable    
PME -0.02811** 0.6938 0.06703* 0.5137 
Non_PME 0.02082 0.7414 -0.15864* 0.0805 
Demographic variables    
nonwhite -0.21951 0.0009 -0.26120** 0.0061 
female 0.09673 0.4394 0.02392 0.8941 
married 0.04739 0.4018 -0.06323 0.4363 
Cognitive variables    
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
Affective variables    
Combat 0.10016** 0.0321 -0.03585 0.5930 
O3 -0.52425** .0001 0.11898** 0.1039 
O5 0.30983 .0001 0.27124 0.0020 
     
 N = 964  N = 964  
 F-stat = 36.01** .0001 F-stat  =  3.46** 0.0006 
 R-square=0.2317  R-square=0.0282  
**Significant at the .05 level 
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